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COMPELLED AFFIRMATIONS, FREE SPEECH, AND 
THE U.S. MILITARY'S DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL 
POLICY 
Tobias Barrington Wolff 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scene. At an Air Force base outside 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, early in 1996, two young officers 
have gotten together after work to have some coffee and relax. 
One of the two, Anne, is a lesbian. Since the time she entered 
the service, Anne has assiduously avoided making any refer-
ence to her sexual orientation, as the Don't Ask, Don't Tell 
policy requires. 1 None of her friends or fellow officers know 
· ©1997 Tobias Barrington Wolff. All Rights Reserved. 
1 Clerk, the Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Yale Law School, J.D., 1997. 
There are many people-4:olleagues and mentors alike-to whom I am 
indebted for the assistance that they offered while I was writing this Article. I 
owe my greatest debt of gratitude, however, to the gay and lesbian 
servicemembers who agreed to lend me their experience and wisdom by granting 
the interviews around which this Article took shape. Because some of those 
servicemembers must remain anonymous, I have decided not to thank any of them 
by name; leaving any one of them out of such an acknowledgment would simply 
be unacceptable. This Article would not have been possible without their 
generosity. I dedicate this work to them and to the many tens of thousands of gay 
men and lesbians who continue to render honorable service to our country in the 
U.S. armed forces . 
For his scholarly guidance , I am especially indebted to Owen Fiss, who taught 
me what the First Amendment is really all about. Glenn Edwards, whose 
knowledge in the field of gay rights eclipses my own, was a constant source of 
information, wisdom, and encouragement. Michelle Benecke of Servicemembers 
Legal Defense Network put me in touch with many of my interview subjects and 
enabled this Article to get off the ground. Greg Bowman, Betty Fletcher, Paul 
Gewirtz, Ryan Goodman, William Norris, John Pottow, William Rubenstein, 
Sandhya Subramanian, Cynthia Griffin Wolff, Robert Paul Wolff, Kenji Yoshino, 
and the members of the Spring 1997 Sexual Orientation Workshop at Yale Law 
School all gave the kind of serious critical attention to this Article that any 
scholar would be thankful for. All errors are my own. 
' S ee Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, 10 U.S .C. § 654 
(1997). The statute begins by listing fifteen legislative findings, the first fourteen 
of which essentially offer arguments for the proposition made in the fifte enth, that 
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that Anne is gay, and Anne never talks about "gay issues" 
around the base. The other officer, Nancy, is straight. Nancy 
"[t]he presence in the ar med forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or 
intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high 
standards of morale, good order and discipline , and unit cohesion that are the 
essence of military capability." Id. § 654(a)(15). The statute goes on to require that 
a member of the armed forces be separated from the service on a finding of one 
or more of the following: 
(1 ) That the member has engaged in , attempted to engage in, or 
so licited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are 
further findings, made a nd approved in accordance with procedures set 
forth in such regulations , that the member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and cus-
tomary behavior; 
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to r ecur; 
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or 
intimidation; 
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's 
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of 
the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and 
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in 
homosexual acts. 
(2) Tha t the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or 
bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made 
and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations, 
that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who 
engages in , attempts to engage in , has a propensity to engage in, or 
intends to engage in homosexual acts. 
(3) That the member h as married or attempted to marry a person 
know n to be of the same biological sex. 
Id. § 654(b) 
The sta tute's definition of "homosexual act" reads as follows: 
(3) The term "homosexual act" means-
(A) any bodily contac t, actively undertaken or passively permitted, 
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual 
desires; and 
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand 
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described in 
subparagraph (A). 
Id. § 654(0 (emphasis added). 
This definition includes not only sexua l activity as traditionally understood, but 
also behavior such as hugging or hand-holding. See Able v. United States, 88 F .3d 
1280, 1291 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that "homosexual conduct" includes 
"handholding"). In contrast, the only formal limita tions that the military places on 
a heterosexual servicemember's choice of sexua l acts (as distinguished from the 
servicemember's choice of sexual partners) a re found in the Uniform Code of Mili-
t ary Justice's criminal penalties for sodomy-anal a nd oral sex. See 10 U.S.C. 
§ 925(a) (1997), codified at U.C.M.J. a rt. 125; see also Able, 88 F.3d at 1291 
(" [T]here is no doubt that the Act treats homosexuals and heterosexuals differently 
even though they have engaged in similar acts within a broad range (from 
handholding to intercourse)."). 
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has known Anne since the two started officer training together 
a few years earlier. The following conversation-an unremark-
able one for the two fri ends-takes place on a wintry Tuesday 
evenmg. 
Nancy: So what are you doing for Easter next month? 
Anne: Going to my folks' house, probably. [She smiles wryly.] 
Once I graduated from high school and actually left 
home, my parents decided that the holidays were Ex-
tremely Important Events that r equired my attendance. 
You? 
Nancy: I'm going with Dave to visit his family in Michigan. 
Anne: And are we happy about these plans? 
Nancy: Oh, Dave's family is great. Dave himself, however, turns 
into a space alien whenever we go to visit them. [They 
laugh.] Oh, Annie, you know how a man acts when he 
takes you home to meet the family for the first time, 
right? 
Anne: [Anne's eyes drop for a moment and her smile fades a 
bit.] I ... guess we all know about that. 
Nancy: Well, Dave hasn't quite managed to move beyond that 
phase yet. I figured that he would loosen up around his 
family after we got engaged last fall, but that hasn't hap-
pened. If anything, he's gotten more uptight. 
Anne: At least it probably means that Dave won't m ake you visit 
the in-laws too frequently after you two get married. 
Nancy: True, true. Still, I suggest you stand far away from the 
bouquet toss at our wedding this summer. Believe me, you 
have enough to worry about in "this man's Air Force" 
without also taking on a man's set of issues with his fami-
ly! [Nancy laughs heartily; after a slight hesitation, Anne 
joins in .] 
This is the most prosaic of scenes. It is the type of conversation 
that any one of us might expect to have with a friend or ac-
quaintance. It also illustrates the heart of the First Amend-
ment right that is burdened by the U.S. military's Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell policy ("DADT"): the right not to be compelled to 
make a false affirmation of one's identity, ideas or beliefs. 
Unlike the blanket exclusion that preceded it, the Don't Ask, 
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Don't Tell policy permits gay people to serve in the military. 2 
It does so, however, only on condition that they acquiesce in 
lies-indeed, that they lie actively-about the most personal 
aspects of their lives and their identities . The new policy does 
more than mandate mere silence; it compels gay 
servicemembers to make involuntary and false affirmations of 
a heterosexual identity that is not their own. It imposes, in 
other words, what the Supreme Court pronounced in "\-Vest 
Virginia State Board of Education u. Barnette3 to be among 
the most serious of burdens on an individual's First Amend-
ment rights: to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion [and] force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."4 
It is impossible to be "agnostic" as to one's sexual orienta-
tion in the course of normal social interactions. Rather, there 
is a presumption of heterosexuality that pervades our lives. In 
all but the most unusual of circumstances, people will assume 
that any given individual is straight unless they have reason 
to believe otherwise . That assumption informs every conversa-
tion and interaction.5 People's most ordinary statements and 
2 Each branch of the service has issued regulations under the new policy that 
make it clear that gay men and lesbians are now allowed to serve in the military 
while at the same time imposing special burdens on their speech rights . For ex-
ample , the Navy's implementing regula tion under the po licy reads, in pertinent 
pa rt, as follows: 
A person's sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, 
and is not a bar to service entry or continued servi ce unless manifested 
by homosexual conduct. During the accession process , a ll applicants, pros-
pects and members of the dep [sic] sha ll not be as ked or required to 
reveal whether they a re heterosexua l, homosexua l or bisexual and will 
not be as ked or required to reveal if they have engaged in homosexual 
conduct unless independent evidence is r eceived indicating that the appli-
cant engaged in such conduct or unless the applicant volunteers a state-
ment that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual or words to that effect. 
Navadmin 033/94 PP 4, 9.C(3). See also DoD Directive 1332.14.H.l.a (1993) ("Sex-
ua l orientation is considered a personal a nd private matter, and homosexual ori-
entation is not a bar to continued service unless m anifested by homosexual con-
duct."); Able, 88 F.3d at 1298 ("[T]he Act does not bar those who have a homosex-
ual orientation but are not likely to engage in homosexua l acts."). 
3 319 U.S . 624 (1943). 
' Id. at 642. 
5 As Professor Janet Halley has written, "To borrow the langua ge of semiol-
ogy, the public status 'heterosexual' is an unmarked signifier, the category to 
which everyone is assumed to belong. Something has to happen to mark an indi-
vidual with the identity, 'homosexual.' " J anet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: 
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questions regularly carry with them the presumption that 
those with whom they are speaking are straight, just like 
Nancy's half of the conversation does in the scene reproduced 
above . Moreover, a gay person's silence in such a situation is 
not a neutral response; rather, silence serves to reaffirm this 
"heterosexual presumption." \Vhen a gay person does not dis-
abuse others of the erroneous presumptions of heterosexuality 
that they have made-when Anne is silent about her gay iden-
tity, for example, in the face of Nancy's comments and ques-
tions-she is affirming a straight identity as surely as if she 
actually framed the lie in words. And silence frequently is not 
sufficient-or even feasible-when one attempts to hide a gay 
identity. Gay people are sometimes forced to lie actively about 
who they are if they wish to keep their identities hidden. For a 
gay person, in other words, the experience of being in the clos-
et is not an experience of having no public sexual identity at 
all; it is one of pretending to be straight. When silence as to 
one's gay identity is compelled, at all times and in all situa-
tions, this false affirmation of heterosexuality is compelled, as 
well. A policy that permits gay people to serve in the military 
but prohibits them ever from identifying themselves as gay is a 
policy that compels gay servicemembers falsely to identify 
themselves as straight. 6 
Among the Federal Courts of Appeals that have analyzed 
the constitutionality of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy under 
the First Amendment,7 none has understood the nature, or the 
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, L~:Sbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 915, 946 (1989). 
6 Professor Nan Hunter made this point concisely at the end of her Commen· 
tary in the Virginia Law Review. 
[S]uppression of identity speech leads to a compelled falsehood, a 
violation of the principle that an individual has the right not to speak as 
well as to speak. In the absence of identity speech, most persons are 
assumed to be heterosexual. To paraphrase the ACT-UP slogan, silent = 
straight. To compel silence, then, is to force persons who are not hetero-
sexual in effect to lie. 
Nan D. Hunter, Commentary, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 
1718 (1993). 
7 See Holmes v. California Army Nat'! Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 
(1997); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, SO 
F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). Shortly before 
this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying en bane 
review in Holmes that was accompanied by a dissent from the denial of rehearing 
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extent, of the burden that the policy places on gay 
servicemembers' speech rights. Those courts have framed their 
analysis in terms of the evidentiary use to which the military 
puts a servicemember's statement that she is gay. They have 
concluded that, if same-sex sexual behavior may be regulated, 
then a servicemember's speech about her gay identity may 
legitimately be used as sufficient evidence of her "propensity" 
to engage in the forbidden homosexual acts. Such an analysis, 
whatever its technical merits , fails to address the core of the 
policy's impact: the fals e affirmation of heterosexual identity 
that the policy constantly forces upon gay servicemembers. 
This Article seeks to unite some of the Supreme Court's 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence with a common-
sense account of the lived experience of gay men and lesbians 
in order to provide the understanding that has heretofore been 
lacking in judicial review of the policy. 3 It takes as its starting 
en bane by Judge Harry Pregerson. See Holmes v. Cal iforn ia Nat'! Army Guard, 
No. 96-15726 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1998) (order denying rehearing en bane). The dis-
sent, which was joined by Judges Reinhardt, Kozinski , Hawkins and Tashima, 
touches briefly upon the thesis of this Article. See id. (Pregerson , J., dissenting) 
("From another perspective, as a practical matter the silence that this policy im-
poses on gay and lesbia n military personnel can lead others to presume that they 
assent to a view about their own sexuality that they do not es pouse."). 
8 In his paradigm-shifting analysis of the Supreme Court's decis ion in Bowers 
u. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Professor Kendall Thomas properly criticizes 
those legal scholars who complacently accept the conceptual frameworks offered by 
the Supreme Court in conducting their analyses of individual claims of right, par-
ticula rly in the realm of privacy. 
[I]f one believes, as I do, that the intellectua l concerns and commitments 
of students of constitutional jurisprudence overlap but a re not congruent 
with those of the Supreme Court itself, one might well ask whether this 
strategy of assessing the Court's work exclusively or primarily on its own 
terms helps or hinders the dis tinctively critical project of constitutional 
scholars hip . 
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1435 
(1992). Professor Thomas makes this criticism the launching-off point for his own, 
radical and virtuosic analysis. 
This Article proceeds from the premise that, in the realm of the First Amend-
ment, the Court's well-established doctrines are, in fact , entirely sufficient to pro-
duce a meaningful and sophisticated analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. It 
aims its challenge at the failure of those judges who have reviewed the policy to 
understand the lived experience of gay men and lesbians and to recognize the ap-
plicability of those doctrines to that experience-a species of challenge that Thom-
as a lso invokes, to powerful effect. See id. a t 1498-99. I attribute this difference 
in approach to a meaningful difference in the state of the law in the areas of 
freedom of expression and of privacy, a subject that I will address, briefly, later 
on. See infra notes 81-92, 185 and accompanying text. 
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point, in Part I, the stories of gay and lesbian 
servicemembers-those who have served under the Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell policy and those who served under the blanket ex-
clusion that preceded it. Their stories illustrate the impact 
that the forcibly imposed closet of the new policy has upon the 
gay people whom the military now formally invites to join its 
ranks. They give needed depth and substance to the harms 
that the Court first identified in West Virginia u. Barnette .9 
The Article then goes on to provide an approach for conducting 
a proper First A.rnendment analysis of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. 
Part II analyzes the policy's reliance on the expressive power 
of the silence of gay and lesbian servicemembers and discusses 
the Court's treatment of silence in its First Amendment juris-
prudence. Part III examines the special relationship that exists 
between compelled affirmations and identity speech. Finally, 
Part IV draws these strands together and scrutinizes the policy 
through the lens of West Virginia v. Barnette. 
I. THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE: STORIES OF GAY SERVICEMEMBERS 
IN THE MILITARY 
Any author who chooses to incorporate individual narra-
tives into a legal analysis bears the burden of explaining the 
purpose for which those narratives are offered. This is especial-
ly true following the powerful critique that Professors Daniel 
Farber and Suzanna Sherry have levied at the haphazard use 
of personal narratives that they believe has characterized 
much recent scholarship. 10 Farber and Sherry take particular 
aim at feminist legal scholars and critical race theorists, whom 
they criticize for attempting to escape the scrutiny of tradition-
al, rigorous scholarly standards. 11 Such scholars, they explain, 
frequently claim to write from a unique and distinctive per-
9 In her analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, Professor Halley has 
emphasized what she calls "an important aspect of [gay servicemembers'] bringing 
their challenge to the public forum of the federal district court: the opportunity to 
display to the court the actual human beings upon whom the Statute stood ready 
to operate." Janet E. Halley, The Status I Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions 
to Military Anti-Gay Policy: A Legal Archaeology, 3 GAY L. Q. 159, 182 (1996). 
10 See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An 
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
11 See id. at 809-19. 
1148 BROOKLYN V1 W REVIEW [VoL 63: 1141 
spective-to speak in a "different voice"12 that cannot easily 
be translated into the analytic prose of legal analysis and so 
cannot be evaluated by traditional standards. Farber and Sher-
ry reject such strong claims of narrative prerogative. Instead, 
they "suggest that legal scholarship should help the reader 
understand law, and that legal scholarship should comport 
with the goals and attributes of the academy."13 Thus, while 
they unreservedly embrace the proposition that "some story-
telling is a legitimate form of legal scholarship,"14 Farber and 
Sherry insist that scholars "take greater steps to ensure that 
their stories are accurate and typical, to articulate the legal 
relevance of the stories, and to include an analytic dimension 
in their work." 15 "The crucial test of scholarly writing," they 
conclude, "must be whether it provides an increased under-
standing of some issue relating to law."16 
For present purposes, this Article need not engage with 
the broader implications of Farber and Sherry's challenge, as 
the purpose for which it offers the interviews that follow is a 
relatively conservative one. The Article seeks to demonstrate 
that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy imposes burdens on the 
expressive rights of gay and lesbian servicemembers that can 
readily be described under the Supreme Court's existing First 
Amendment jurisprudence, but that the federal courts have 
failed to produce a meaningful analysis of the policy because 
they have simply failed to understand how the dynamics of the 
closet actually operate in the everyday lives of gay people. 17 
12 ! d. at 809. The term comes from Carol Gilligan's pathbreaking work of the 
same name. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
13 Farber & Sherry, supra note, at 809 . 
" !d. a t 808. For an example of Farber and Sherry's own use of narrative in 
legal analysis, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 257, 265 (1996). 
15 F arber & Sherry , supra note, at 809. 
16 Farber & Sherry, supra note 10, at 824. See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing 
the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 , 1030 (1991) (" [I]t seems reasonable to ask 
of narrators who are, in fact, legal scholars that their stories be framed in s uch a 
way as to shed light on legal questions."). 
17 Thus, this Article utilizes individua l narra tive for a purpose that is narrower 
than those proposed by Professor Willi am Eskridge in his response to Farber and 
Sherry. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. , Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 
(1994) . Eskridge argues that "gaylaw provides a particularly attractive field for 
n arratives, even under the conse rvative criteria laid out by Farber and Sherry," id. 
at 610, precisely because gay peop le and their stories have been actively repressed 
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Indeed, this failure of understanding has amounted to what 
Professor Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has termed a "privilege of 
unknowing."18 Sedgwick has observed that it can be an effec-
tive tool for wielding social power to remain ignorant of the 
cultural identity or experiences of others. "If IYI. Mitterand 
knows English but Mr. Reagan lacks French," for example, "it 
is the urbane M. Mitterand who must negotiate in an acquired 
tongue, the ignorant Mr. Reagan who may dilate in his n ative 
one."19 More gener ally, "it is the interlocutor who has or pre-
tends to have the less broadly knowledgeable understanding of 
interpretive practice who will define the terms of the ex-
change."20 Sedgwick's observation certainly holds true in legal 
analysis, where the ability of a claimant to benefit from an 
established legal doctrine is always limited by the ability of a 
judge to recognize, after engaging in a formal dialogue with the 
claimant, that the doctrine in question should in fact apply. 2 1 
Thus, the interviews in this Article are offered for the purpose 
of demonstrating a crucial fact about the lived experience of 
gay people that has heretofore been absent from judicial review 
of the policy: that forcing a gay person to remain silent about 
her sexual identity, at all times and in all places, in fact forces 
her to affirm a heterosexual identity that is not her own, and 
so to live a lie. 
I take Professor Susan Bandes' recent article on the use of 
victim impact statements in capital sentencing hearings to 
offer a powerful endorsement of such a use of individual narra-
tive.22 In denouncing the Supreme Court's validation of victim 
in American jurisprudence, remaining hidden and invisible until very recently. He 
then provides a rich account of the particular difficulties that gay claimants ca n 
encounter in legal settings. Eskridge argues persuasively that gay narratives can 
have a transformative impact by demonstrating the hidden inequities in s tate 
policies, see id. at 611-17, or the connections among seemingly unrelated policies, 
see id. at 617-21; can offer challenges to the categorical assumptions upon which 
policies and legal doctrines frequently rest, see id. at 621-30; and can reinforce 
activist political movements , giving focus to radical challenges to the proper scope 
of law and state regula tion, see id. at 630-40. 
18 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Privilege of Unknowing: Diderot's The Nun, in TEN-
DENCIES 23 (1993). 
19 !d. 
20 !d. 
2 1 See Thomas, supra note 8 , at 1456 ("It is precisely this 'ignorance effect' 
that provides an ideological anchor for the oppression of gays and lesbians, which 
the secrecy of the 'closet' has historically aimed to mitiga te."). 
22 See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. 
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impact statements,23 Professor Bandes argues that the propri-
ety of introducing individual narratives into formal legal analy-
sis depends in large part on the extent to which those narra-
tives have, or have not, already been taken into account in the 
process of articulating and administering a legal doctrine. 24 
The impact of violent crime upon its victims, she concludes, 
suffers from no infirmity in this regard: 'n.vVe do not need elabo-
rate structures to assist us in feeling fear, pain, and grief for 
those like us who have suffered violence at the hands of the 
other. This is already the dominant narrative of the criminal 
trial. "25 Because the story of the victim of a violent crime is 
one of the primal, animating forces that gave rise to the crimi-
nal justice system in the first place, the heavy-handed reintro-
duction of that story into the ongoing administration of the 
system adds very little and threatens to distort or unbalance 
the decision making process. Similarly, in order for a newspa-
per to argue to a court that it ought to be able to invoke the 
doctrine forbidding prior restraints when it is threatened with 
a restrictive injunction, it need not provide a highly personal-
ized account of the harms that the paper, its readership, and 
the larger community will suffer if it is enjoined from publish-
ing its controversial story. The doctrine of prior restraint grew 
out of the Court's painfully adequate understanding of those 
precise harms. Rather, it is when courts demonstrate a com-
plete inability to mediate between general rules and particular 
cases in this fashion that it is most clearly necessary for indi-
vidual narrative to reenter legal analysis. 26 
CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996). 
23 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruli':lg Booth v. Maryland, 
482 U.S. 496 (1987)). 
24 See Bandes, supra note 22, at 382-90. 
25 Bandes, supra note 22, at 409. 
26 I borrow this phrase from Professor Mark Tushnet, who has written at 
length about the use of narrative in legal scholarship . See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, 
The Flag-Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39 
(1990); Mark V. Tushnet, A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America, 14 
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 539 (1989) (book review). In one essay, Tushnet summarizes 
his approach , arguing that "constitutional adjudication [should be) the vehicle we 
use to mediate particular cases and general rules." Mark V. Tushnet, Colloquy, 
The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992). Acknowledg-
ing the particular capacity of narrative to ground legal analysis in concrete experi-
ence, Tushnet asserts that a proper use of narrative is one that facilitates this 
mediation between the particular and the general , rather than distorting or ob-
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In theory, then, these interviews should be unnecessary to 
this Article's project. If a legal audience could be relied upon to 
recognize the most basic facts about the everyday lives of gay 
men and lesbians and to understand how those facts map onto 
the existing analytical framework of the First Amendment, 
then the Article could simply proceed directly to its constitu-
tional analysis. 27 But the performance of the federal judiciary 
in its analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has made it 
clear that, at least for now, something more is needed in order 
to ensure that the claims of gay servicemembers are heard and 
understood. 28 
Twenty-one individuals from all different parts of the 
country and all different branches of the armed forces agreed 
to be interviewed for this Article. Most served under the Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell policy and have recently left the military. A 
number were litigants in challenges brought against the policy 
structing it. See id. at 256-58, 258-60, 297-310. Und er Tushnet's approach, then , 
the function of the interviews in this Article is to inject into judicial revi ew of the 
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy some of the particularities of the lives of gay 
servicemembers that have thus far been absent. In other words, this Article's 
contention-to use Tushnet's terms-is that the necessary process of media tion has 
never occurred in judicial review of the policy because the relevan t particularities 
have been entirely absent from the court's understanding. Thus, it is not simply 
the case that judges have engaged in the process of mediation tha t Tushnet calls 
for and have come up with flawed results; rather, through their ignorance, they 
have bypassed that process altogether. 
27 In some feminist legal scholarship, in contrast, narratives constitute a vital 
component of an article's thesis. The work of some feminist scho lars emphasizes 
the importance of concreteness and particularity-as opposed to abstraction and 
generalization-in structuring normative arguments and rules of law. See Abrams, 
supra note 16, at 975-76 (discussing different strands of feminist methodology). 
Similarly, some feminist scholars have levied challenges at the legitimacy of the 
impartial, authoritative voice of linear reason in which most traditional lega l schol-
arship grounds itse lf. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 16, at 976, 987; Marie Ashe, 
Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law , 
13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989) (bringing these methods to bear on issue of women's 
reprod uctive rights). For these scholars, individual narrative is a vital component 
of their work; it is partly constitutive of their arguments. This Article makes no 
such claims. 
28 In characterizing that "something more ," Professor Richard Delgado has writ-
ten that "(s)tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives a re powerful means for de-
stroying mindset- the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared 
understandings against a background of which legal and politica l discourse takes 
place." Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1988). See also Thomas, supra note 8 , at 
1498- 99. 
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in federal court. A few are still serving on active duty. The 
interviews took place between February and August of 1997. 
The texts of the interviews are drawn from servicemembers' 
responses to broad , open-ended questions about their experi-
ences living under the policy and, in particular, the ways in 
which the policy has forced them to prevaricate or lie. Every 
individual who agreed to participate in these interviews had 
already devoted a great deal of thought to the issues of identity 
and personal integrity that the Article explores-a fact that 
probably comes as no surprise to most gay and lesbians read-
ers , whether they have served in the military or not. Gay men 
and lesbians must regularly make decisions about how to navi-
gate their own personal closets-how to "manage" public 
knowledge of their sexual identities in the face of the persis-
tent presumption that everyone is heterosexual unless proven 
otherwise. 29 It should come as no surprise to find that gay 
29 Professor Kenji Yoshino provides a cogent descrip tion of this dynamic in 
questioning the propriety of the "closet" as a symbol for the problem of sexual 
self-definition: 
Gays can never be out and done with it; they must continually reiterate 
their sexual orientation against a heterosexist presumption that reinstates 
itself at every pause. The most damaging failure of the closet symbol is 
perhaps that it misrepresents the continuum of a person's disclosure of 
his or her homosexual orientation as a binary constructed from the end-
points of that continuum. One is either "out" or "closeted": the closet 
with its rigid door between the "outs ide" and the "inside" does not lend 
itself to subtler gradations. Howeve r , these gradations are not only rele-
vant, but crucial to an understanding of gay oppression. First, gays come 
out in a gradual process that is misrepresented by a construct that 
marks some point as the point at which they "come out." Second, most 
gays disclose their homosexuality to some but not to others-for example 
to their fam ilies but not their co-workers, or vice-versa-in a way that 
the closet, which does not perform such discrimination between audiences, 
fails to reflect. Fina lly, because it is impossible for any gay to be fully 
"out" or "closeted," the endpoints of the continuum on which the binarism 
is based do not exist. 
Kenj i Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for 
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1810-11 (1996). Professor Halley has given a simi-
lar account of the presumption's operation: 
[B] ecause the assumption of heterosexuality applies in virtually every 
social interaction-from the encounter of teacher with student, salesper-
son with shopper, mother with daughter , Supreme Court Justice with 
clerk-even the mos t forth right and fearless gay man or lesbian cannot 
"come out" once and for all in a single public disclosure; as she moves 
from one social setting to another, she will have to come out afresh or 
acquiesce in the assignment to her of a nonreferential public iden tity. 
Halley, supra note 5, at 947. 
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and lesbian servicemembers, whose careers frequently depend 
upon their success in managing their public identities, have 
devoted careful thought to that "identity management" process 
and the questions of honor and integrity that it raises. 30 The 
lies that gay and lesbian servicemembers are forced to tell 
about themselves under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy are, to 
say the least, a matter of active concern for them. 
Under normal circumstances, members of the military 
regularly have free or unstructured time, and most 
servicemembers began their interviews by focusing on that 
portion of their duty. A consistent theme that runs throughout 
their accounts is the regularity with which the most ordinary 
of social discourse in the military can implicitly bring an 
individual's sexual orientation into issue. Indeed, this implicit 
introduction of sexual orientation into social discourse fre-
quently does not lie far beneath the surface. The interview of 
former Navy Lieutenant Tracy Thorne speaks to this issue. 
Thorne entered the Navy after graduating from Vanderbilt 
University. He trained as a pilot and flew an A-6 Intruder 
fighter plane until being separated and discharged after com-
ing out of the closet on the television show, "Nightline." He has 
brought a challenge to the policy in federal court that is still 
ongoing. 31 Speaking with hints of a light, formal Tennessee 
30 As Professor Ha ll ey has pointed out, it is discrimination, in particular, that 
forces gay people to focus such scrupulous attention on both their private concep-
tions and the public's perception of their identities: 
Antihomosexual discrimination encourages people to manipulate the iden-
tity they attach to themselves, both in the· secrecy of their own minds 
and on the public stage, in what I shall call their subjective and their 
public identi ties. It ensures that personal desires, sexua l behavior, subjec-
tive identity and public identity will frequently get out of sync with each 
other. However carefu lly an individual disposes these elements, they are 
all subject to sudden, either joyous or catastrophic, rearrangement. 
Halley, supra note 5, at 933. 
31 In 1993, Thorne brought suit in the Eastern District of Virginia to challenge 
the constitutionality of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. While he initially met 
with some success in district court, that favorabl e disposition was vacated in light 
of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Thomasson u. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(en bane). See Thorne v. Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1996). On 
remand following Thomasson, Thorne lost his case. See Thorne v. Dep't of Defense , 
945 F. S upp. 924 (E.D. Va. 1996). His appeal is currently pending in the Fourth 
Circuit. 
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accent, Thorne describes the atmosphere that prevailed among 
the "fly boys" who were his peers and buddies while he was 
still on active duty. 
The general thing tha t you faced on a regula r basis was that, pa rtic-
ularly being in a Naval aviation squadron, there's this kind of 
swashbuckling m entality among the junior officers. For example, 
where I was stationed at Virginia Beach , they had what was consid-
ered to be the ultim ate Officer's Club. When I was there, through 
the early 90s, it was fill ed with local women hunting for husbands, 
femal e strippers-it was one big party, with Navy pilots flying in 
from all around the country. The "thing to do" in your fre e time was 
to head down to the 0' Club. If you didn't want to head down there 
and ogle the bare-breasted women with all the other guys, people 
would ask questions. Sometimes you could quietly sneak away, but, 
you know, you couldn't always do tha t , so you had to make like you 
were enjoying it. 32 
Moreover, as Thorne goes on to say, even those times when he 
could "quietly sneak away" were not free from difficulty. 
Friends naturally want to know how we spend our free time, 
and buddies in the military are no different. Spending time 
with gay friends, however, is something that no gay 
servicemember can speak about with any candor. Thorne de-
scribes the dilemma that he and many others have faced. 
After a typical weekend, I would show up at the squadron on a Mon-
day morning, and everyone would ask, "WhJ.t did you do this week-
end?" I couldn't tell them, for example, that I went to a movie on a 
date. I would have to make stuff up, like that I worked on my ca r or 
something.33 
Indeed, one's sexual orientation is regularly brought into 
issue in settings that are less explicitly concerned with sexual 
titillation than the "0' Club" scene that Lieutenant Thorne 
describes. A story from former Air Force Captain Elizabeth 
Hillman is typical of many others. Hillman spent most of her 
active duty time working as an orbital analyst at Cheyenne 
Mountain Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. She 
retired from the military after satisfYing her obligation to the 
Air Force in 1996 and has since enrolled as a student at Yale 
Law School. Speaking methodically and with frank openness, 
32 Telephone Interview with Tracy Thorne, form er Lieutenant, United States 
Navy (Apr. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Thorne Interview]. 
33 !d. 
,. 
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Hillman tells of the complications that the heterosexual pre-
sumption can cause in the close relationships that exist among 
peers in the service. 
Because you can't speak up about your sexual orientation, you can't 
put people at ease if they feel uncomfortable with the amount of 
time you're spending with their partners. Wives and girlfriends can 
easily feel threatened by the close working conditions between men 
and women in the service, and there are times when you really want 
to put someone at ease and tell her that she doesn't have to worry 
about you going after her partner, but you can't do that if the reason 
is that you're gay. For that matter, a woman will often get even 
more nervous about your close working relationship with her part-
ner because you're not reassuring her by telling her that you already 
have a boyfriend or a husband. You frequently wind up inventing 
stories anyway, to defuse a difficult situation .... One time in par-
ticular that this was a problem for me was when I was training for a 
marathon with [a male friend]. ... Obviously, we were training 
together, alone, for hours every clay. His wife was feeling threatened 
by the amount of time that we were spending together, and there 
was nothing I could say to explain that she didn't need to feel 
threatened unless I made something up or told her that I was a 
lesbian.34 
Such dilemmas are not limited to servicemembers' free 
time. The workplace also presents many seemingly innocuous 
situations in which the sexual orientation of servicemembers is 
inexorably brought into issue, as a story from Anonymous 
Officer Number One can attest. Anonymous Officer Number 
One is a woman and a senior officer currently serving on active 
duty in the armed forces. She requested that her name, branch 
of service, and other identifying information be kept confiden-
tial because she feared that she would be vulnerable to repri-
sals if anyone suspected that she had made a contribution to 
this Article. Anonymous Officer Number One is an experienced 
and formidable professional, but her voice carried an edge of 
apprehension and fear throughout the entire course of our in-
terview. In speaking of the conditions under which she must 
work as a closeted lesbian, she describes details that the most 
careful examination by an outsider seeking to understand the 
true impact of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy might easily 
overlook. 
34 Interview with Elizabeth Hillman, former Captain, United States Air Force, 
in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Hillman Interview]. 
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Another thing is photos on my desk, at work. It's a pretty standard 
thing in the office to put pictures of husbands and boyfriends-past 
or present-in prominent places on your desk. Usually, when I walk 
into another woman's office, if I see pictures of pets and family on 
her desk instead of men, I assume she might be gay. For the same 
reason, I don't put pictures like that on my own desk--even though 
I have a beautiful dog that I'd love to show off. In fact, I've thought 
about putting pictures of male friends on my desk and making like 
they're former boyfriends, just to deflect attention. I certainly have 
[lesbian] friends who have done that. 35 
The stresses on gay servicemembers to present a hetero-
sexual identity at the workplace can also be applied in a less 
subtle fashion. Many of the men interviewed for this Article 
talked about the pervasiveness of homophobic jokes and com-
ments among their peers in the military, and traditional 
workplace settings provided no respite from such banter. For-
mer Naval Academy Midshipman Joseph Steffan describes 
such comments as constituting nothing less than an "institu-
tionalized" practice.36 Steffan was discharged from the Naval 
35 Interview with Anonymous Officer Number One, Senior Officer, United 
States Military (April 17, 1997) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Number One]. 
In a highly influential essay, Adrienne Rich discusses the impact of what she 
terms "compulsory heterosexuality" on lesbians as individuals and on the women's 
movement more generally. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and 
Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 22 (1986). Expanding upon work 
begun by Katherine MacKinnon, Rich analyzes the particular set of enforced be-
haviors that gay women face in the workplace setting: 
A lesbian, closeted on her job because of heterosexist prejudice, is not 
simply forced into denying the truth of her outside relationships or pri-
vate life. Her job depends on her pretending to be not merely heterosexu-
al, but a heterosexual woman in terms of dressing and playing the femi-
nine, deferential role required of "real" women. 
Id. at 41-42. 
36 Interview with Joseph Steffan, former Midshipman, United States Naval 
Academy, in Hartford, Conn. (Feb. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Steffan Interview]. 
Steffan's observation echoes Professor Thomas' account of the role that homophobic 
violence-whether realized physically or verbally-plays in the oppression of gay 
men and lesbians. 
The terroristic dimensions of homophobic violence compel us to under-
stand it as a mode of power. To put the point in slightly different terms, 
homophobic violence is a form of "institution." ... Homophobic violence 
is a social activity "structured by rules that define roles and positions, 
powers and opportunities, thereby distributing responsibility for conse-
quences." 
Thomas, supra note 8, at 1467 (quoting Claudia Card, Rape as a Terrorist Institu-
tion, in VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND JUSTICE 296, 297-98 (R.G. Frey & Christopher 
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Academy in 1987 after revealing that he was gay. He unsuc-
cessfully challenged the blanket-exclusion policy that preceded 
Don't Ask, Don't Tell.37 Almost ten years after being formally 
separated from the military, Steffan's demeanor, appearance 
and surroundings are still highly ordered and efficient. Recall-
ing the atmosphere of the Naval Academy, he describes the 
frequency with which he found it difficult not to "join in on the 
joke" when his peers would make homophobic comments be-
cause he could not give an honest account of his objections to 
such remarks without revealing his own sexual orientation. 
One incident in particular stood out in his mind during our 
interview. 
I served at times on a battalion performance board-a board that 
reviewed and monitored the quality of individua ls' work in the bat-
talion. At one point, the board had to review the performance of a 
particular midshipman who was not doing very well. When the mid-
shipman showed up for his review hearing, he had his hair parted 
straight down the middle. Another member of the Board-a senior 
battalion commander-took one look at him and said, "Go back and 
comb that part out of your hair, you look like a fucking faggot!" In 
that context, there was no way that I could object to a comment like 
that without calling my own sexual orientation into question. For 
that matter, I couldn't have explained why I found the comment 
inappropriate and offensive without explaining that I was gay. I had 
to continue with the review and act like I thought that telling some-
one that he looks like a "faggot" was an appropriate way to dress 
him down.38 
W. Morris eds., 1991 )). 
37 See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C:. Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
38 Steffan Interview, supra note 36. Michelle Benecke, the Executive Director of 
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, confirms that Steffan's experience is a 
common one: 
It's not enough, even, to be silent in the face of anti-gay harassment ; 
they also have to participate or they're going to be thought to be gay. 
You cannot be neutraL When you're neutra l, peop!e notice. This is an 
environment where people work together very closely to accomplish a 
mission. If people are trying to mask a life or pretend they don't have 
one, it sticks out like a sore thumb. You have to affi rmatively invent a 
heterosexual life. Part of that means joining in on the harassment that is 
about you. 
Telephone Interview with Michelle Benecke, Executive Director, Servicemembers 
Legal Defense Network (Apr. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Benecke Interview). Professor 
Marc Fajer has made similar observations. See Marc A Fajer, Can Two Real Men 
Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for 
Lesbians and Gay Men , 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 592 (1992). See also STUDS 
TERKEL, THE GOOD WAH: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO 180 (1984); 
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Incidents like the one that Steffan relates-and the kinds 
of interactions that Thorne, Hillman and Anonymous Officer 
Number One describe as taking place in the workplace, in 
recreational spaces and during off-hours-combine to form a 
pervasive, unstructured background against which anything 
other than an explicitly avowed heterosexual identity would 
stand out in sharp relief. Feminist theorist Monique Wittig has 
observed tha t "to live in society is to live in h eterosexuali-
ty .... Heterosexuality is always already there within all men-
tal categories."J9 Whether gay and lesbian servicemembers 
must affirm a heterosexual identity in words-as, frequently, 
they must- or whether their enforced silence is loud enough to 
claim the "default characterization"40 of h et erosexual identity 
that most conversations offer, the background of social rela-
tions in the military, as in most other contexts, is one of pre-
sumptive, compulsory heterosexuality. 
The more structured activities of military existence are no 
less rife with occasions in which servicemembers are forced to 
make explicit, public affirmations of their sexual identities. 
Formal social events constitute perhaps the most important 
example of such a structured activity. Dances, balls and formal 
dinners are a regular and central element of the social life of 
every branch of the armed forces. Among officers, attendance 
at such events is necessary in order to enjoy any hope of ad-
vancement within the ranks. Every individual interviewed for 
this Article, without exception, made reference to this dynamic 
and described the conflicts that formal social events create for 
gay and lesbian servicemembers living inside the mandatory 
closet of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. Anonymous Officer 
Number One's account is typical. 
The service tends to be a fairly tight-knit environment-you social-
ize with the people that you work with, especially when you're s ta-
tioned overseas. Every time there's a social event-and there tend to 
be at leas t two formal events every year, along with lots of informal 
get-togethers-there's interest on the part of your fellow officers 
Halley, supra note 5, at 934, 947-48 & n.67. 
39 MONIQUE WI'ITIG, THE STRAIGHT MIND 40 , 43 (1992); see also Michael 
Warner, Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER P LANET, at vii (Michael Warner ed., 
1993). 
40 Janet E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality , in FEAR OF A QUEER 
PLAI'lET 82, 83 (Michael Warner ed. , 1993). 
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about who you're going to bring. It's not necessarily prurient inter-
est, it's just friendly a nd curious. They want to know whether h e's 
going to be military or non-military; if he's military, a fighter pilot is 
a lot better then a JAG lawyer; if he's not military, is he a business-
man or is he a car mechanic? I tend to go stag, just to avoid a lot of 
these proble ms . But of course, going s tag a ttracts attention, too. 
When people ask, I tell them I choose to go stag because, as I ge t 
more senior, the pool of available men gets smaller, a nd that I have 
a blanket rule against dating men I work with. The other option is 
to bring a safe date, but then people just continually ask you about 
how things a re going with that guy that you brought to the dance, 
so it doesn't really avoid the problem .. 11 
Tracy Thorne spoke in his interview of the consequences of not 
making appearances at such events. 
Formal events a re definitely a major part of a military career. If 
you're n ot seen going out to the Office r's Club on a somewhat regu-
lar basis, if you're not a ttending the Intruder Ball, 42 if you're not 
attending Dress Messes, eventually that's going to cut into you . You 
have to be a "team player" in order to advance . A [gay] fri end of 
mine who's in the Marine Corps knows a lesbian couple, and one of 
them h as agreed to attend functions with him on a regular basis, 
just because you need that in order to advance.43 
Former Navy Lieutenant Paul Thomasson has similar 
stories to relate . Thomasson, a highly decorated and widely 
praised Naval officer, was separated and discharged after he 
came out of the closet immediately following the effective date 
of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. He challenged the constitu-
tionality of the policy in federal court, ultimately losing his 
case before the assembled judges of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 44 Thomasson now lives in Washington State and re-
mains unabashedly angry at the treatment that he received, 
both in federal court and in the press, following his separation 
41 Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35. 
42 The Intrud er Ball was the premier social event at Virginia Beach, as Thorne 
had explained earlier in his interview: "We had a huge banquet every year called 
the 'Intruder Ball ,' because the plane that we flew was called the A-6 Intruder. It 
was the biggest social event of the year-a must-attend." Thorne Interview, supra 
note 32 . 
43 Thorne Interview, supra note 32. 
" See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). 
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and discharge. That sentiment is apparent in his tone and de-
meanor as he recalls some of the details of formal social events 
in the Navy. 
There unquestionably is overt pressure to engage in unit functions. I 
can remember one of my commanders demanding that I go to a 
"dining out,"- one of the formal officers' dining occasions. As usual, I 
didn't want to go because of the "date" problem, but with the com-
mander demanding that I go, I couldn't just not show up. This par-
ticular time, though, I had another excuse I could use. Some of the 
guys in the squadron had made a hoiTible international faux pas 
recently-[behaved really badly on a trip to Japan) ... -so I told 
my commander that I was disgusted at the ward room for their 
behavior and I intended to boycott the event to upbraid the squad-
ron. So that wasn't quite a lie, that time--I just made a much bigger 
deal of this other incident than I ever would have otherwise. Of 
course, my commander was very angry-when a commander says 
you should go to a dining out and you refuse, you had better have a 
good excuse. I was fortunate; had I performed less well at my job, 
my refusal would have hurt me, and I was just fortunate that I was 
a top performer.45 
Formal social events are perhaps the most visible among 
those structured activities in the military that force 
servicemembers to make statements about their sexual orien-
tation, but they certainly are not the only such activities to 
raise the issue. While Elizabeth Hillman has stories of her own 
to relate concerning social events,46 she provides an account of 
another required activity in the military that involves some-
what less pageantry. 
Women in the service have to go to a gynecologist and get a pap 
smear done, at least once a year. One standard question that the 
gynecologist has to ask is, ''What form of birth control are you cur-
rently using?" Obviously, you couldn't just say, "None"-I don't think 
it was even an option on the form. For a straight woman, that would 
be crazy. You had to make up a more believable response. You also 
couldn't really claim to be using one of the safer methods of birth 
45 Telephone Interview with Paul Thomasson, former Lieutenant, United States 
Navy (Apr. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Thomasson Interview]. 
46 As Hillman said at onE; point: 
Formal events-dances, or what have you-are a standard thing that 
every unit has. Everyone goes, and everyone is expected to bring a date. 
Every time it comes up, if you go without a date, or if you don't go at 
all, people ask questions-it raises eyebrows. So some gay people bring 
fake dates to quell suspicions. 
Hillman Interview, supra note 34. 
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control, [since those might; be relevant to health issues that your 
gynecologist would want to know about.] ... Personally, I would say 
"abstinence" or "rhythm," as would some other lesbians I know, and 
we would have to go through sessions where the gynecoiogists would 
explain how risky those methods were, ask us whether the problem 
was that we fel t uncomfortable with condoms or the pill, and so 
forth.~ ' 
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Perhaps the greatest impact that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell 
policy has is not to be found in structured activities or in casu-
al social settings, but within the confines of gay 
servicemembers' families and their close friendships with their 
fellow soldiers . Because members of the armed forces are con-
sidered to be on duty at all times, the policy forbids them from 
ever speaking truthfully about their identities, even in private 
moments. 48 While it 1s sometimes possible for gay 
47 Hillman Interview, supra note 34. S ee also SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE 
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T AsK, DON'T 
TELL, DoN'T PURSUE," at 6 (1997) [hereinafter SLDN REPORT] ("The services 
have reportedly instituted the disturbing practice of requiring health care providers 
in the military and those contracted to the military to turn in gay servicemembers 
who seek their help in private counseling sessions."). 
48 The Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy applies to servicemembers twenty-four hours 
a day. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(9)-(10) (1997). This means that even a private ac-
knowledgment by a gay servicemember of his sexual orientation, if discovered , can 
trigger a separation proceeding under the policy. See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 
932 ("[S]ervice members who have not publicly declared their homosexuality are 
nevertheless s ubject to discharge if they have made private statements to that 
effect, when those statements are brought to the attention of commanding offi-
cers .. "). As Servicemembers Legal Defense Ne twork reports: 
In their zealous pursuit of suspected gay military members Pentagon 
officials have expanded "Don't Tell" in ways that most Americans a re not 
aware, to include private statements to family members, close fr iends, 
doctors and psychologists. Servicemembers must keep their sexual orien-
tation an absolute secret, hidden even from their families, or risk investi-
gation and discharge. 
SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 5-6. 
In her recent Article, Professor Halley quotes from a m emorandum that the 
Judge Advocate General's office has distributed to Air Force investigators to guide 
them in gathering information once they have begun a formal investigation. 
Halley's research seems to corroborate SLDN's conclusions: 
"If acts or other military members are discovered during the proper 
course of [an] investigation, . . . appropriate action may be taken .... 
Has the member told any of his family members? . . Has the member 
been dating anybody (opposite or same sex)? How frequently has the 
member dated? How recently? How can these people be contacted? ... 
Did the member belong to any homosexual student organizations at 
school? If so, which? How can other members of the organization, who 
knew of his membership , be contacted?" 
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servicemembers to avoid formal or social situations where they 
would otherwise be forced to put on a public appearance of het-
erosexuality, it is almost impossible to prevaricate in such a 
manner with close, intimate friends-and, of course, it is all 
the more painful to try. For some gay sen.ricemembers, this can 
mean not forming close friendships at all , as Paul Thomasson 
explains. 
When you'r e not having to lie actively, you spend your time avoiding 
the questions or changing the subject. The r esult is that-OK, if I 
look at gay people whom I know in the military, many of them are 
the over-achi evers, the best and brightest, et cetera. A third to a 
half of the J oint Chiefs of Staff interns were gay when I was there. 
They got there because they had no life and poured all of their ef-
forts into their jobs-to the point of having to avoid making too close 
a ttachments at work. You don't really get close to people when you 
can't speak freely with them!9 
The experience of Anonymous Officer Number Two com-
ports with Thomasson's observation. Anonymous Officer Num-
ber Two is a senior command officer and is still a member of 
the armed forces. He asked that his precise rank and the 
branch of the armed forces in which he serves not be revealed, 
as that information might suffice to identify him and render 
him vulnerable to reprisals. He is also the only gay 
servicemember interviewed for this Article who unapologetical-
ly approves of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. His interview 
thus provided a rare and valuable perspective on the effects of 
the policy. Anonymous Officer Number Two h as kept his per-
sonal life and his professional life in the armed forces com-
pletely separate, living in "many little rooms," as he puts it. 50 
He has segregated the different parts of his life to such an 
extent that, by his own account, he has formed no open and 
lasting friendships with straight colleagues in the armed forc-
es, despite a lifetime spent in military service. 
H alley, supra note 9, at 213 (quoting Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 
USAF/JAG, memorandum for a ll Staff Judge Advocates and Military Judges, Re: 
Commander Inquiries on Members Stating They are Homosexual, Nov. 3, 1993; 
and id., attachment 2, "Sample Questions for Inquiry Concerning Member who 
Sta tes He is Homosexual After Receiving Advanced Education Benefits."). 
49 Thomasson Interview, supra note 45. 
50 Interview with Anonymous Officer Num ber Two, Senior Command Officer, 
United States Military, at an undisclosed location (July 19 , 1997) . 
1997] U.S. MILITARY'S DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL POLICY 1163 
I've alw ays been absolutely divorced, my sexual life from my profes-
sional life .. . . The greatest "sin" is the sin of omission sometimes, 
so I just omit talking about my personal life to anyone in the mili-
tary, in my professional life .51 
Anonymous Officer Number Two, unlike the other 
servicemembers interviewed for this Article, has found this 
social privation to be agreeable. 52 
Most gay and lesbian servicemembers do form close fri end-
ships, however, and those friendships can occasion some of the 
greatest pain that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy inflicts. As 
discussed above, gay and lesbian servicemembers often go to 
great lengths to avoid social functions so as not to appear con-
spicuously single. Anonymous Officer Number One explains 
that, while such strategies and "cover stories" may serve to 
deflect casual inquiries, they do not help in her interactions 
with close friends. 
There are fri ends m my life-men and women-who are simply 
concerned about me because I am not dating somebody. Do I have 
somebody to take care of me? Am I lonely? Is there someone in my 
life to help me out? These friends are just expressing their concern, 
but I can't tell them the truth . I either t ell them that I'm not inter-
ested in dating right now-that I don't have time for a man in my 
life, something like that-or else I invent a long-distance boyfriend. 
When your fri ends are persistently concerned about you , you have to 
t ell them something. 53 
Michelle Benecke confirms that this experience is a com-
51 !d. In contrast, Anonymous Officer Number Two has fou nd opportunities to 
develop friendships-and more-with gay servicemembers. As h e explained: "I had 
a lover who was my 'personal assistant' for eleven years and lived with me in a 
mili tary home. Nobody ever questioned it. His presence isn't even on my record. 
My sexuality just h ad nothing to do with my career." 
!d . 
!d . 
52 As he said at one point during our interview: 
I'm not "gay," I'm homosexual, and there's a big differe nce . ... If 
you come to my home, you'll see there's nothing about it that's "gay," 
and these "gay activists" that go around demanding "gay rights" really 
disgust me .... I knew what I was getting into when I went in [to the 
military]. I didn't join the [armed forces] to get a date. . . I'll retire 
with a pension of $120,000- you tell me what the payoff is . Do I fee l 
deprived? No .... Would I do it all over again? Absolutely , and I would-
n't do anything differently. 
53 Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35. 
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mon one. Benecke served in the Army for six years, leaving the 
service in 1989 with the rank of Captain. She is now the Exec-
utive Director of Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, the 
organization that serves as the primary resource in the United 
States for gay and lesbian servicemembers, offering both coun-
seling and legal advice. Benecke reports that almost every 
client she sees comes to her organization after the policy has 
provoked an unbearable ethical dilemma. In the majority of 
cases, this ethical dilemma grows out of a forced separation 
from close friends or family. In fact, in Benecke's experience, 
the problem is most acute during one of the times when family 
and friends are most important: the holiday season. 
[W]hen people are deployed, gay people can't even be honest in any 
communication with anyone at home, unlike heterosexual soldiers, 
because everyone's mail is censored and their telephone calls are 
monitored. These people are not able to be out to their families be-
cause of DADT; they can't be out with their loved ones because of 
DADT; and they have to face the prospect of losing their lives in 
service of their country. Right around the holidays , when people are 
just coming back, we get a big spate of calls from people trying-to 
figure out what to do. 54 
Sometimes, gay and lesbian servicemembers find the pros-
pect of lying to their close friends too painful to bear. They 
resolve to tell the truth, despite the enormous risk to their 
careers, their futures, and their safety. Elizabeth Hillman 
recalls the time that she was faced with this difficult choice. 
I had a close friend-[l et's call him "Rick"]-who worked in the same 
office I did at Colorado Springs. [Rick] came into work one day with 
a sort of far-off look on his face and asked me, completely out of the 
blue, "Beth, when was the last time you were in love-! mean, real-
ly, head-over-heels in love?" It was a totally innocent, friendly ques-
tion-he might even have meant it to be a little flirtatious. I 
blanched, had no idea what to say in response. The truth was that I 
had recently met [the woman with whom I'm now sharing my life] 
and fallen head-over-heels in love with her, but I wasn't allowed to 
tell him that. I managed to stutter some noncommittal answer and 
change the subject, but I felt extremely uncomfortable with that re-
sponse. [Rick] was a friend, and I didn't like lying to him, for any 
reason. It finally led me to come out of the closet to him a few days 
later. I sat down with him to have a talk about our earlier conversa-
tion, and I told him, "I didn't quite know what to say, because I'm in 
54 Benecke Interview, supra note 38. See also Fajer, supra note 38, at 597. 
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love right now, but it's not with a man."55 
What price does the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy exact from 
gay and lesbian servicemembers when it forces them to choose 
between telling lies about themselves and risking the sacrifice 
of their careers and their safety? The answer must necessarily 
be differen t for every individual. Even so, it would not be over-
stating the case to say that it is the r are gay or lesbian soldier 
for whom that toll is not a heavy one. Anger, quiet r esentment, 
and sincere regret over the false identities they have been 
forced to adopt were common among the servicemembers who 
agreed to be interviewed for this Article. The armed forces are 
organized around an ethic of honor and respect. Being com-
pelled to lie about the most personal aspects of one's life to the 
friends and associates who are supposed to be one's closest 
allies in guarding that ethic cannot help but do damage to a 
servicemember's spirit and her sense of self_56 Perhaps noth-
ing could provide a more appropriate illustration of this price 
than the words of a servicemember who is still living under the 
onus of that compelled dishonesty on a daily basis. Anonymous 
Officer Number One tells the following story of her life under 
the policy. 
The job that I'm in now is one that's designated "high security." As 
part of my intervi ew for my security clearance, I was asked to rate 
myself as to how honest of a person I am, on a scale from one to ten. 
My first reaction was, well, I don't believe in absolutes , but I think 
55 Hillman Interview, supra note 34. 
56 Indeed, P rofessor Halley invites us to reflect seriously upon the extent to 
which our creation of a public identity can become cons ti tutive of the entirety of 
our social existence. She argues that we do not merely become less honest when 
we must lie about who we are-we become less ourselves, in social as well as legal 
intercourse. 
[H]omosexuals who experience their sexual desire as immutably orien ted to-
wards persons of their own sex nevertheless may be coerced to pretend that 
they conform to the norm of heterosexuality. Such a result is no mere fib: it 
is a change. To be sure, what has changed is not the suppo3ed essence of 
· sexua l orientation , but the representation of it available for social interpreta-
tion. But essences, conceding for a moment their existence, are not visible to 
legislatures, judges, employer s, or police. Socia l agents work with social mean-
ing; the fairness and ind eed the constitutionality of their acts must be mea-
sured in the context of the practical, not the ideal, epis temology of their 
decisionmaking. 
Ha lley, supra note 5, at 934 (cita tion omitted). See also Fajer, supra note 38, at 
596-97 (discussing im pact of dishonesty and prevarication upon closeted gay men 
and lesbians). 
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I'm a very honest person; so I rated myself a nine. But then, as I 
was wallting out of my interview, I thought, how could I possibly 
have rated myself a nine, this whole thing is a lie. I normally am 
such an honest person, but the military requires me to lie about this 
one part of my life that's so important. [She pauses.] I got my securi-
ty clearance. 57 
Stories like these might properly shape one's assessment 
of the wisdom of Don't Ask, Don't Tell as a matter of policy, 
but it is not for that purpose that they are recounted here. 
They are recounted because understanding these stories is a 
prerequisite to producing a meaningful constitutional analysis 
of the policy, whatever the ultimate conclusion of that analysis 
might be . It is not simply the case that the interest of gay and 
lesbian servicemembers in not being compelled to make false 
affirmations of their identity has been undervalued in judicial 
review of the policy; it has been entirely overlooked. These 
stories provide the tools with which to begin the necessary, 
formal inquiry into the legal significance of that interest. 
II. SILENCE AS SPEECH 
A. The Value of Silence 
The expressive power of the silence of gay and lesbian 
servicemembers is central to the operation of the Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell policy. To understand why this is so, it is necessary 
to understand the nature of the value structure that the 
military's policy was designed to defend. In his classic essay, 
Nomos and Narratiue,58 Robert Cover has offered a frame-
57 Anonymo us Interview Number One, supra note 35. A:. Professor Halley has 
suggested, such deception can threaten more than a gay person's honesty and 
integrity; it can threaten her very sense of self. Halley describes the effects of a 
policy requiring mandatory dismissal of C. I. A. agents who admit to being gay, and 
the D.C. Circuit opinion (affirmed by the S upreme Court) that upheld it: 
[The opinion] opens a pocket of legal protection fo r individuals who obey 
a prohibition on homosexuality not by eschewing homosexual acts or 
rejecting a homosexual subjective identity, but by ap pearing straight. One 
cost to them of accepting that protection is that they must also accept 
the public meaning of their equivocal position-the court's equation of 
their closetedness with the assumption that they have internalized the 
substantive determination that homosexuality is degrading to them. 
H a lley, supra note 5, at 958. 
58 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and 
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work within which to describe the norms and value structures 
of a community. Cover's approach looks to the depth of the 
commitment that a community demonstrates in defending a 
particular set of values or a particular, narrow definition of 
membership . As one paradigm, Cover identifies communities 
that embrace a diversi ty of individuals and institutions among 
their members and are structured around the enforcement of 
rule-based norms, exhibiting only a shallow, thin commitment 
to any particular moral or ethical precepts . He describes such 
groups as "imperial" in nature and offers the State-and, more 
broadly, legal communities-as the most visible examples.59 
In contrast, Cover describes what he calls the "paideic" com-
munity: a group that is characterized by a deeper form of com-
mitment, one whose reason for existing centers around a par-
ticular conception of the good, a deeply held value structure, or 
a nonpluralistic definition of membership. 6° Cover suggests 
that paideic communities-which might include groups defined 
by their religious, cultural, or ethnic affiliations-are the most 
important sites for the creation of cultural meaning. As he 
puts it, such communities constitute the source of those "narra-
tives that imbue [the legal] precepts [of modern, "imperial" 
nation-states] with rich significance."61 
The institution of the military challenges the fixity of the 
distinction between the imperial and the paideic-and, concom-
itantly, the fixity of the distinction between pluralistic State 
institutions, on the one hand, and communities with deeply-
held commitments to particular cultural values, on the oth-
er. 62 In form, the .A .. merican military is, fundamentally, a 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
59 Cover writes: 
In [the "imperial"] model, norms are universal and enforced by institu-
tions. They need not be taught at all, as long as they are effective . Dis-
course is premised on objectivity-upon that which is external to the 
discourse itself. Interpersonal commitments are weak, premised only upon 
a minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and violence that 
would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the impartial 
and neutral application of norms . 
!d. at 13. 
60 AB Cover puts it: "[T]he term ['paideic'] suggests: (1) a common body of pre-
cept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way of being educated into this 
corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as the individual 
a nd his community work out the implications of their law." !d . at 12-13. 
61 !d. at 16. 
62 Cover recognizes that, in practice, these categories ordinarily are not realized 
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pluralistic institution . Unlike the armies of nobility in medi-
eval Europe , where the honor of professional military service 
was reserved for the wealthy and the powerful, 63 the U.S. mil-
itary embraces the principle that underlies most public institu-
tions in America: Applicants are to be judged on their qualifi-
cations alone, and all those who are qualified are at least eligi-
ble to participate. 64 To be sure, the qualifications and require-
ments of service in the military interfere with servicemembers' 
deeply-held personal commitments, more so than do the re-
quirements of any other public institution in America. The Su-
preme Court has observed that the armed forces constitute "a 
specialized society"65 that requires "instinctive obedience, uni-
ty, commitment, and esprit de corps"66 in aid of effective mili-
tary service, even though these values sometimes require 
servicemembers to accept compromises in their ability to dem-
onstrate their commitment to their paideic communities . It is 
for this reason that the Court accords great deference to the 
military whenever individuals bring claims under the First 
in "pure" form; he states : "Of course, no normative world has ever been created or 
maintained wholly in either the paideic or the imperia l mode . I am not writing of 
types of societies, but rather isolating in discourse the coexisting bases for the 
distinct attributes of all normative worlds. " Id. at 14. Indeed, Cover goes on to 
acknowledge the danger that the State poses when it embraces "paideic" commit-
ments, and he praises West Virginia u. Barnette and other cases for the 
protections they provide from that danger . S ee id. a t 61 ("Certain decisions have 
acknowledged the dangerous tendencies of a s tatist paideia and marked its bound-
aries through formal specifica tion of the limits of public meaning."). 
63 See, e.g., F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 16- 19 (1952 ). 
6
' In the Federal Constitution, this foundational no rm finds expression in the 
Equal Protection Clause and in the a bolition of Titles of Nobility and Bills of 
Attainder. S ee U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l ("No S ta te shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 
8 ("No Title of Nobility sha ll be granted by the United States."); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 
3 ("No Bill of Attainder ... shall be passed."). The id eal of equality of opportuni-
ty for qualified applicants has consistently shaped the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence of individual rights. In Regents of the Uni versity of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), for example, the Court s truck down a Cali-
fornia affirmative action program on the grounds that the program left no opportu-
nity for white applicants to compete for certain admiss ion seats, regardless of how 
the qualifications for those admission seats were defined. "No matter how strong 
their qualifica tions, quantita tive and extracurricular, including their own potential 
for contribution to educational diversity," the Court explained , white applicants 
"are never a fforded the chance to compete with applica nts from the preferred 
groups for the special admission seats." Id. at 319. 
65 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). 
66 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). 
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Amendment, the Constitution's primary source of protection to 
paideic communities.67 Even so, the military ordinarily admin-
isters even its most invasive restrictions in what Cover would 
call a "statist" or "imperialist" manner: It requires that all 
servicemembers satisfy the same neutral standards of ability, 
appearance, obedience and respect. In according deference to 
the military in its Speech and Religion Clause analysis, the 
Court has taken pains to reiterate that the First Amendment 
still applies to limit the actions of the military,68 and it has 
consistently demanded even-handedness in the definition and 
administration of military regulations. 59 
In substance, however, the American military has exhibit-
ed a deep and consistent commitment to a norm that runs 
counter to the otherwise pluralistic tenor of its criteria for 
admission and service. The military is the primary site for the 
definition of manhood in American culture, and military ser-
vice is the most important opportunity for citizens to attain to 
that virtue. Professor Kenneth Karst has written about the 
67 The First Amendment, of course, guards the expressive, religious and 
associational interests of the citizenry. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances."); see also Cover, supra note 58, at 26-33, 60-67 (discussing importance 
of First Amendment protection of speech, association and religion to existence of 
paideic communities). 
68 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) ("[M]embers of the military 
services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment .... "); see also 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[The special] aspects of mili-
tary life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the 
guarantees of the First Amendment."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) 
("[T]he members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by 
the First Amendment."); cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) ("[O]ur 
citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have 
doffed their civilian clothes.") (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the 
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)). 
69 See, e.g., Brown, 444 U.S. at 358 n.15 (upholding regulation requiring official 
approval of petitions circulated on Air Force bases, but explaining: "Commanders 
sometimes may apply [such regulations] irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily, 
thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the First Amendment.") (internal quota-
tion omitted); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (requiring that regulations 
restricting political demonstrations on military property be "objectively and 
evenhandedly applied"); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring) (provid-
ing fifth vote to uphold application of Air Force D.ress code to yarmulke worn by 
observant Jew because "the rule that is challenged in this case is based on a 
neutral, completely objective standard-visibility"). 
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American military's commitment, throughout its history, to the 
specification and enforcement ofthe qualities that are constitu-
tive of manhood .70 Those qualities, he points out, have been 
far from plurali stic. The military's definition of m asculine vir-
tue-a definition that has played a unique rol e in setting stan-
dards for citizenship status in America71-has repeatedly 
found expression in discrimina tory restrictions on the qualifi-
cations for military service. Indeed, Karst argues tha t this 
institutional "pursuit of manhood" has been the primary cul-
tural motivation for most of the major instances of discrimina-
tion in mili tary personnel policies. During the period when 
African-American men were still openly dismissed in American 
popular culture as unacceptable exemplars of masculine virtue, 
the military defended that racist construction of manhood, first 
by excluding blacks from military service altogether, then by 
segregating them into second-class units. 72 Similarly, Karst 
argues, the exclusion and segregation of women has been the 
result of the military's commitment to a vision of masculine 
virtue that excludes women from its core . For many years, 
women were entirely barred from military service. Eventually, 
the claims of women to equal citizenship status gained suffi-
cient force that the military, in its capacity as a pluralistic 
institution, felt compelled to make an accommodation and 
admit them among its ranks. Nonetheless, women continue to 
be largely excluded from active combat, the aspect of military 
70 See Kenneth L. Karst , The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the 
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. RE V. 499, 500 (1991). For a further exploration of the 
importance of military service to defining the virtue of manhood, see, for example, 
RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS & GAYS IN THE U. S . MILITARY, 
VIETNAlvl TO THE PERSIAN GULF 28-36 (1993). 
71 See Karst, sup ra note 70, a t 502-03, 505-06. Professor Leisa Meyer charac-
teri zes the importance of military service to the definition of the rights of citizens 
in the following terms: 
[B)ecause the military is a critical bas tion of state power and service 
within it a determinant of the rights of citizens, a llowing heterosexual 
women, lesbians, and gay men to participate within it fu lly and without 
harassment or discrimination increases expectations that those same 
groups will be treated with fairness and respect in the public sector. 
LEISA D. MEYER, CREATING G.I. JANE: SEXUALITY AND POWER IN THE WOMEN'S 
AR;vrY CORPS D URING WORLD WAR II , at 1 (1996). 
72 See Karst, supra note 70, a t 510-22. 
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service that serves as the primary site for the definition of 
manhood, permitting the military to maintain its commitment 
to traditional masculine virtues. 73 
Karst concludes that the policy that excluded all gay men 
and lesbians from military service sprang from the same 
source. The military has defended a conception of manhood 
that defines gay men as lesser, degenerate versions of their 
heterosexual peers and defines lesbians as aber.Lant, ambigu-
ous transgressors of essential gender boundaries. 74 Such a 
vision of manhood depends upon the categorical exclusion of 
gay identity. 75 The acknowledged and open presence of gays 
and lesbians in military service would threaten that vision. 
Therefore, heterosexuality became a necessary qualification for 
military service. As Karst explains: 
For those who want to keep the public's gaze fixed on "the manli-
ness of war," the tensions of male bonding demand a clear expres-
sion of the services' rejection of homosexuality. This expression is 
not just a by-product of the policy that purports to exclude gay men 
and lesbians from the armed forces; it is the policy's main function. 
When a gay soldier comes to the Army's official attention, the real 
threat is not the hindrance of day-to-day operations, but rather the 
tarnishing of the Army's traditionally masculine image. 76 
Under the blanket exclusion of gay men and lesbians that was 
the subject of Karst's investigation, the policy's defense of mas-
culinity was straightforward and unmediated. The explicit 
requirement of heterosexuality as a qualification for service 
operated to secure the traditional definition of manhood to 
73 See Karst, supra note 70, at 523-45. Professor Meyer provides a description 
of the military at around the time that women were first admitted: 
[T]he ideological construction of "soldier" as a man with a weapon 
who fights, and the military as a preeminently masculine institution, 
continued [when women were first admitted to the armed forces] to in-
clude all white men, whether or not they saw combat, and black men 
who were active combatants, while excluding all women entirely. 
MEYER, supra note 71, at 12-13; see also MEYER, supra note 71, at 11-32. 
74 See Karst, supra note 70, at 546-47; see also ALLAN BERUBE, THE HISTORY 
OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II at 13-14 (1991). 
75 As Professor Cover writes: "The radical instability of the paideic nomos forc-
es intentional communities-communities whose members believe themselves to 
have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their common lives - to 
maintain their coherence as paideic entities by expulsion and exile of the potent 
flowers of normative meaning." Cover, supra note 58, at 15-16. 
76 Karst, supra note 70, at 545-46. 
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which the military was committed. It did so, however, at the 
expense of the pluralistic values that the military, as a State 
institution, has an obligation to promote. 
The current policy originated as an accommodation to 
those pluralistic values. In 1993, Navy Lieutenant Keith 
Meinhold challenged the military's blanket exclusion of gay 
men and lesbians in a federal district court in California. The 
district court struck down the policy on equal protection 
grounds, reinstated Meinhold, and issued a nationwide injunc-
tion to prevent the military from discharging any other gay 
servicemembers.77 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
quashed the injunction and affirmed Meinhold's reinstatement 
on much narrower grounds. The circuit court construed the 
policy to require a conduct violation in order to support a dis-
charge, avoiding an interpretation that would have authorized 
discharges on the basis of status alone. 78 The court went on to 
suggest that a policy banning gay people from service solely on . 
the basis of their sexual orientation would present serious 
constitutional problems.79 
In response, the military sought to craft a policy that 
would satisfy its obligations as a pluralistic institution while 
still allowing it to continue to defend a heterosexual vision of 
manhood. What resulted was Don't Ask, Don't Tell, permitting 
gay people to serve but forcing them to do so in silence. Under 
the new policy, the military is able to defend its commitment 
to heterosexual manhood precisely because it can rely upon 
society's general presumption of heterosexuality to transform a 
gay servicemember's silence into an affirmation of heterosexual 
identity. The expressive power of silence in matters of sexual 
identity thus permits the military to maintain its paradoxical 
role as both an imperial public institution with pluralistic 
standards of admission and a paideic community that creates 
and defends a purely heterosexual vision of masculine virtue. 
77 See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1457-58 (C.D. 
Cal. 1993), affd on different grounds, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994). 
78 See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 34 F. 3d 1469, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
79 S ee id . at 1476-77. 
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By compelling gay servicemembers to remain silent about their 
true identities, the policy requires them to embrace and affirm 
that vision. This is the intended mode of the policy's opera-
tion. 80 
In calling for a recognition of the affirmative role that 
silence plays in maintaining the value structure that underlies 
the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, this Article embraces a project 
similar to the one that Professor Jed Rubenfeld has advanced 
in calling for a reconceptualization of the right to privacy. 81 
Rubenfeld has argued that "the fundamental right to privacy is 
not to be found in the supposed fundamentality of what the 
law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes ."82 
Proscriptive models of the right to privacy, he explains, ulti-
mately rest upon some theory of "personhood"-that is, an 
account of which activities are "fundamental" to our concept of 
personhood and, for that reason, should not ordinarily be sub-
ject to regulation by the State.83 Rubenfeld convincingly ar-
gues that such theories suffer from severe problems of defini-
tion and administration, inevitably producing intractable dis-
putes over, for example, what parts of our identities are "fun-
damental,"84 or how an "identity" (or an identifying trait) is to 
8° Compare Professor Halley's description of the holding of the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Doe u. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd in part, 
reu'd in part on the other grounds, sub. nom. Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 
(1987) in Halley, supra. note 5, at 956-58. In Casey , the D.C. Circuit denied relief 
to a gay agent of the C. I.A. who claimed that the agency's policy of denying secu-
rity clearance (and employment) to gay peop le denied him due process of law. In 
rejecting the agent's claim that the policy placed an impermissible stigma upon 
him, Halley observes, the court gave a reading to the policy that purported to 
demonstrate greater fidelity to the impera tives of fairness and due process but 
that actua lly operated to define the agent's interests out of existence: 
The court purports to view the problem of stigma from Doe's point of 
view: if he disclosed his homosexuality, he clearly sees nothing scandal-
ous in it; and if he sees nothing scandalous in his homosexuality, he has 
no liberty interest in evading its lega l consequences . The apparent re-
spect paid here to Doe's sel f-conception and self-description is revealed as 
a sham if we note the implication of the court's reasoning: a self-identi-
fied homosexual in government employment, in order to retain a liberty 
interest in his or her job, must (1) subjectively regard his or her homo-
sexuality as degrading and (2) hide it. 
Ha lley, supra note 5, a t 957. 
81 See Jed Rubenfeld , The Right of Priuacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1989). 
82 !d. at 739. 
83 See id. at 738-39. 
84 See id. at 754-70. 
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be defined and limited.85 As an alternative, Rubenfeld urges 
us to examine the affirmative impact that a regulation has 
upon its target when it affirmatively takes over their lives, 
forcing them into certain narrow channels. For example, where 
a woman's right to have an abortion is concerned, Rubenfeld 
argues that "[w]omen should be able to abort their pregnancies 
so that they may avoid being forced into an identity"-that of 
motherhood-"not because they are defining their identities 
through the decision itself."86 It is those laws that "tend to 
take over the lives of the persons involved"87- to "occupy and 
preoccupy"88-that should require extraordinary justification 
from the Sta te and provoke searching judicial scrutiny . Thus, 
Rubenfeld argues, to determine whether a law impermissibly 
infringes upon an individual's right of privacy, we should ask 
whether it "affirmatively and very substantially shape[s that] 
person's life."89 
This Article meets Rubenfeld's challenge on different, but 
related, doctrinal ground. It identifies the silence that the 
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy imposes upon gay servicemembers 
as an attempt not merely to proscribe the expression of gay 
identity in the military-Professor Karst's central in-
sight90-but to require the affirmative expression of hetero-
sexual identity by gay and straight servicemembers alike. 91 
Under the terms of the policy, gay servicemembers are forced 
to participate in the project of defining and reaffirming a value 
structure that excludes them entirely from its core. Rubenfeld 
85 See id. a t 770-82. 
86 Rubenfeld , supra note 81 , a t 782 
87 Rubenfeld, supra note 81, a t 784. 
88 Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 784. 
89 Rubenfeld, supra note 81 , at 784. 
90 See Karst, supra note 70 , at 545-46. 
91 Thus, in arguing that Bowers u. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was wrongly 
decid ed, Rubenfeld writes: 
We tend , in measuring [the] morality [of laws prohibiting homosexual 
conduct], to form an image of either the homosexual imprisoned or the 
homosexual forced to give up his sexual acts . We ought, however, to give 
up the image of "the homosexual" in the first place and measure the law 
instead in terms of its creation of heterosexua ls (a nd , in a different way, 
of homosexuals too) within the standardized parameters of a state-regu-
la ted identity. 
Rubenfe ld , supra note 81, a t 801. See also Thomas, supra note 8, at 1497-98 (dis-
cussing Rubenfeld 's treatment of Bowers) 
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properly instructs us to ask what affirmative acts of speech the 
forced silence of the policy imposes, and not merely what acts 
of speech it proscribes. 92 
92 See Rubenfeld , supra note 81, at 739. Having embraced the large-scale di-
mensions of Rubenfeld 's project, I must regi s ter my dissa tisfaction with his own 
a pplication of his thes is to anti-gay regulations . Whi le his analysis contains hi nts 
of a sophisticated unders ta nding of the economy of public sexual identities in 
which closeted gay people must trade, Ruben fe ld nonetheless seems to have an 
understanding of the impact gay people feel from restrictions on sexual intimacy 
that is at once overbroad and under-inclusive. He writ es: 
[T]he prohibition against homosexual sex channe ls individuals' sexual 
desires into reproductive outlets. . The proscription is against homo-
sexual sex; the products are lives forced into rel a tions with the opposite 
sex that substantia lly direct individuals' roles in society and a large part 
of their everyday existence ... . [T]he real force of anti-homosexual laws , 
if obeyed, is that they enlist and redirect physical and emotional desires 
that we do not expect people to suppress. 
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 800. This analysis is overbroad in the insularity tha t 
it ascribes to the lives of gay men and women. It seems to assume that a gay 
person's natural state of being is one in which "relations with the opposite sex" 
are not "a large part of [one's] everyday existence." Rubenfeld, supra note 81, a t 
800. Unless Rubenfeld means to use "relations" narrowly as a euphemism for 
sex-which, clearly, he does not, see Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 799-801-then 
he has a vision of how gay people lead their lives that is, to say the least, con-
testable. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1506-07 (criticizing Rubenfeld for simplistic 
understanding of life-choices of gay men and lesbians). 
More importantly, Rubenfeld's analysis is under-inclus ive in that it steadfastly 
refuses to allow the invasion into a gay person's intimate life that results from 
restrictions on adult, consensual sexual behavior to enter into its calculus. Under 
Rubenfeld's approach , such an invasion is prohibited , if at a ll , only by virtue of its 
fortuitous congruence \vith the institution-channeling aspects of the r estrictive 
statute. This seems, fundam entally, to miss the point. In making this observation 
(with its invocation of the "fundamental"), I deliberately invite the rejoinder tha t 
my criticism is simply a gesture toward the "personhood" model of privacy analysis 
that Rubenfeld h as so coge ntly criticized. Nonetheless, insofar as Rubenfeld rests 
his theory of privacy entirely on the capacity of a law to force an individual's li fe 
into certain institutional channels , it is simply incomplete. For exaillple, Rubenfeld 
praises Griswold u. Con necticut , 381 U.S. 479 (1965)-in which the Court held the 
use of contraceptives by a married couple to merit protection under a right of 
privacy-as a vindication of his own privacy theory. As in the case of abortion, he 
explains, a contrary res ult would have meant forcing women to devote their lives 
to motherhood. See Rubenfeld , supra note 81, at 791. But does this suggest that, 
where abortion is freely available to women, the use of contraception should no 
longer receive privacy protection? Rubenfeld's own discussion of Griswold hints at 
this result. See Rubenfe ld, supra note 81, at 791 ("At least at the time [Griswold] 
was decided, when abortion was still generally prohibited, the ban on contraception 
was equivalent in its positive aspect to enforced child-bearing."). But to suggest 
that the use of contr aceptives is no longer a vital privacy right because women 
can just go out and get abortions shou ld make us recoil. And why? Because the 
decision whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy is so personal and intimate 
that it wo uld be unacceptable to predicate a policy (or a constitutional analysis) on 
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B. Silence as Speech 
The maxim that silence can constitute speech is one that 
pervades the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence-both in its Free Speech and Establishment Clause 
cases. In analyzing the Court's treatment of this dynamic, it is 
necessary at the outset to distinguish between two different 
issues that the Court has considered regarding silence. These 
might best be described as the issue of silence as a speech 
interest, on the one hand, and silence as speech, on the other. 
The distinction, in other words, is one between situations 
where a claimant asserts an interest in remaining silent and 
thereby not speaking, and situations where a claimant asserts 
that his silence effectively constitutes speech. It is the latter 
dynamic that drives the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. H owever, 
the former situation is also important to the present inquiry. 
The right not to speak is related to the jurisprudence of com-
pelled affirmations embodied in West Virginia v. Barnette and 
its progeny,93 and the Court has recognized that right as one 
that enjoys dignity and force equal to that of the right to en-
gage in affirmative expressive acts. In Riley v. National Feder-
ation of the Blind of North Carolina, 94 for example-a case 
involving a state requirement that charities communicate cer-
tain information when making their requests for dona-
tions-Justice Brennan pronounced the frequently quoted 
maxim that "the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of 
speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both 
what to say and what not to say."95 How this treatment of 
silence as a speech interest fits in to the present inquiry will 
be taken up later in the discussion of Barnette. 96 
an easy willingness to force women regularly to resort to abortion as a contracep-
tive method. Rubenfeld's theory of privacy offers no answer to this problem. 
93 See Hunter, supra note 6, at 1719. 
94 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (Brennan, J.). 
95 Id. at 796-97. See also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 
256 (1974) (striking down Florida statute requiring newspaper to provide space for 
response by those they editorially criticize and holding that "(t]he Florida statute 
operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding 
appellant to publish specified matter"). 
96 See infra Part IV. 
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One of the paradigmatic analyses of communication by 
silence involves the possibility of attribution or endorsement. 
When two potential speakers enjoy a r elationship with each-
other that could lead an uninformed observer to assume that 
the two are voluntarily affiliated-even if that relationship is 
only an incidental or a spatial one-then the observer might 
also attribute the remarks of one speaker to the other in the 
absence of an express disclaimer. Where such a disclaimer is 
impractical or impossible, there may be a danger that one 
speaker will be forced to endorse, by h er silence, the message 
of the other. 
The capacity of silence to constitute an affirmation in this 
manner finds its clearest illustration in the Establishment 
Clause context, in the case of L ee v. Weisman. 97 In Weisman, 
a young student successfully challenged the constitutionality of 
a public school's decision to include a religious invocation as 
part of the commencement ceremonies that it conducted during 
graduation. The school system of Providence, Rhode Island had 
made a practice of inviting local members of the clergy to de-
liver prayers to its graduating middle and high school stu-
dents. Students were admonished to stand and maintain a 
respectful silence while the clergyman delivered his invocation. 
Deborah Weisman, a student at a middle school in Providence, 
claimed that the practice violated the Establishment Clause in 
two respects. First, she maintained that the State's involve-
ment with religion in the commencement ceremonies, which 
included a measure of editorial control over the invocation, was 
so pervasive as to create a "state-sponsored and state-directed 
religious exercise" and thus to constitute an impermissible gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion. 98 Second, Weisman argued 
that the nature of the ceremony was such that she was effec-
tively forced to endorse and participate in the prayer through 
her silence, and that such forced participation in a religious 
exercise was antithetical to the requirements of the Establish-
ment Clause.99 The majority in Weisman accepted both of 
97 505 U .S. 577 (1992). 
98 Id. at 587. 
99 ld. at 593-94. 
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these arguments in awarding Deborah Weisman her victory. It 
is the second argument that is of particular importance for 
present purposes. 100 
Lee u. Weisman is remarkable for its candid and explicit 
reliance on the operation of subtle cultural forces-social con-
ventions-in recognizing the burden that the State-sponsored 
invocation in that case placed on the students' right of reli-
gious freedom. If the students in Providence had actually been 
coerced into making a plain statement of their endorsement of, 
and participation in , the religious invocation, such coercion 
would clearly have violated th e Establishment Clause. The 
Court's ruling rested on its recognition that silence can some-
times have the same meaning and effect as a plain statement 
of this type. The majority observed that "in our culture stand-
ing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or 
simple respect for the views of others."101 Here, the Court 
found that the State forced the students to convey a message 
of participation and endorsement merely by pressuring them to 
remain silent. That message, though perhaps not without am-
biguity, was nonetheless sufficiently intelligible to render the 
ceremony and invocation constitutionally infirm. The Court 
explained: 
There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at 
the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an ex-
pression of participation in the rabbi's prayer. Tha t was the very 
point of the religious exercise. It is of little comfort to the dissenter, 
then, to be told that for her the act of standing or remaining in 
100 Les t there be any ambiguity on the point, I do not mean to suggest tha t the 
actual holding in Lee u. Weisman is applicable to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. 
The Establishment Clause raises unique constitutional concerns, for it prohibits the 
government from engaging in an entire category of expression (religious speech)-a 
proscription that runs directly contrary to the norms embodied in the First 
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. As the Court observed in Weisman: 
Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even when the govern-
ment participates, for the very object of some of our most important 
speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own . . . 
The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and wors hip 
that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, 
but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state 
intervention in religious affa irs with no precise counterpar t in the speech 
provisions. 
Id. at 591. Lee u. Weisman is offered here, instead, for its clear recognition of the 
capacity of silence to constitute an affirmative act of speech. 
101 Id. at 593. 
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silence signifies mere respect, rather than participation. What mat-
ters is that, given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in 
this milieu could believe that the group exerci se signified her own 
participa tion or approval of it. 102 
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It is important to note that the perception with which the 
Court is concerned here is that of th e dissenter h er self, whose 
silence m ay crea te in her "a reasonable perception tha t she is 
being forced by the State to pray in a m anner her conscience 
will not allow." 103 If a student's enforced silence in a ceremo-
ny like the one reviewed in Weisman can create the perception 
in the student's own mind that she has endorsed and partici-
pated in a religious observance that violates her beliefs, then 
such enforced silence can certainly create that impression in 
the minds of others who observe her. 104 
In its Speech Clause analysis, the Court has likewise tak-
en cognizance of the potential for messages to be attributed 
among speakers in this fashion . The case of Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 105 pro-
102 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. See also id. a t 592 ("What to most believers may seem 
nothing more than a reasonable r equest that the nonbeliever respect [others'] reli-
gious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to 
be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious ortho-
doxy."). 
103 !d . at 593. 
10
' Thus far, commentators seem largely to have over looked the importance of 
Lee u. Weisman for its contribution to the analysis of expressive silences. Rather, 
most commentators have focused on the question of whether Weisman can be read 
finally to have rejected the three-pronged test of Lemon u. Kurtzman in Establish-
ment Clause analysis. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 131 (arguing that Lee u. Weisman effectively rejected 
Lemon test); Charles Fried, Forward: Reuolutions2, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 68 n.374 
(1995) ("It would seem that the clarion calls for the abandonment of Lemon have 
finally been heard. ") (citing Lee u. Weisman; Sherry, supra) . At least one commen-
tator has discussed Weisman's implications for the expressive power of si lence, 
albeit in a field very different from that of the present inquiry. In his Article, 
Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 787 (1996), Robert Goldstein invokes Weisman's trea tment of wh at he 
calls the "captive audience" problem in analyzing the speech interests of doctors 
who are subject to restrictions on disseminating abortion information. See id. at 
847-48 & n.185. Goldstein then goes on to tie this problem of the "captive audi-
ence" to the First Amendment's injunction against compelled affirmations, whether 
effectuated by compelled speech or by enforced s ilence. See id . at 853 ("[W]hen 
[an] individual assumes a professional or other work rol e, [Planned Parenthood u. 
] Casey suggests that reasonable regulation may diminish or eliminate this right 
not to be requ ired to endorse-by words or silence- prescribed speech."). 
105 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995). 
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vides a ready example. The controversy in Hurley centered 
around the participation of gay and lesbian marchers in the 
Saint Patrick's Day Parade in Boston. In 1993, members of 
GLIB, 106 a support and advocacy group for gay, lesbian and 
bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants, requested that the 
group be allowed to march under its own banner at the parade. 
The parade's private organizers, the South Boston Allied War 
Veterans Council, denied the group's request. In response, 
GLIB invoked a Massachusetts public accommodations law and 
obtained a state court injunction requiring the parade organiz-
ers to allow its members to march. 107 The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's ruling, but 
the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Justice Souter, unanimously 
quashed the injunction. The Court found, first, that "[p]arades 
are ... a form of expression, not just motion,"108 and, second, 
that forcing the parade organizers to admit an openly gay 
contingent would alter the message that the organizers intend-
ed to communicate. As the Court put it: 
[A] contingent marching behind [GLIB's] banner would at least bear 
witness to the fact thd some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual, and 
the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view 
that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to un-
qualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members 
of parade units organized around other identifYing characteristics. 
The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish 
sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified social accep-
tance of gays and lesbians . . .. 109 
Referring frequently to the case of West Virginia u. Barnette, 
the Court held that it would constitute the most serious possi-
ble violation of the First Amendment to require the parade 
organizers so to propound a message with which they dis-
agreed. 
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to 
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, 
106 As the name of the case indicates, the group's full name is the Iri sh-Ameri-
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. See id. at 2341. 
107 See id. at 2341-43. GLIB had marched in the parade in 1992, also on the 
strength of a court order and against the wishes of the parade organizers. Their 
participation that year was "uneventful." l d. 
108 ld. at 2345. 
109 ld. at 2348. 
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indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to 
nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of ortho-
dox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithe-
sis .110 
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Here, the "propounding" of the contested message was accom-
plished by the parade organizers' silence. 
Having determined that parades constitute an expressive 
activity with a sufficiently coherent message to warrant First 
Amendment protection, 111 the Cour t had to decide whether 
GLIB's presence threatened to alter that message. The dynam-
ic of silence-as-endorsement drove the Court's inquiry into the 
relationship between parade participant and parade organizer. 
"Parades and demonstrations," the Court observed, " ... are 
not understood to be ... neutrally presented or selectively 
viewed."112 Rather, the Court concluded, a parade speaks 
with one voice: that of its organizer. This "univocal" character 
of the parade renders impractical any disclaimer as to an 
organizer's endorsement of a particular message in a parade. 
The organizer is effectively disabled from expressing any dis-
sent; hence, he is forced to endorse every message that the 
individual parade units present. Exercising control over the 
parade's composition, the Court explained, is the only effective 
way to exercise control over the parade's message. 
Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is under-
stood to contribute something to a common theme, and accordingly 
there is no customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow 
any identity of viewpoints between themselves and the selected 
participants. Practice follows practicability here, for such disclaimers 
would be quite curious in a moving parade113 
The holding in Hurley is entirely predicated upon this 
dynamic of silence-as-endorsement. By the opinion's terms, 
there would be no interference with the Council's message if 
"GLIB's participation would [not] likely be perceived as having 
resulted from the Council's customary determination about a 
unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of 
presentation and quite possibly of support as well."114 A simi-
110 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2350. 
111 See id. a t 2345-46. 
112 Id. at 2349. 
113 Id. (quotation omitted) . 
'" Id. at 2348. 
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lar treatment of the expressive power of silence has deter-
mined the outcome of many of the Court's Speech Clause cas-
es. tts 
The Court has also applied this common-sense understand-
ing of the meaning and effect of silence outside the realm of 
the First Amendment. A number of examples are to be found 
in the law of evidence. One is the common-law doctrine of 
"impeachment by silence." If a declarant has remained silent in 
a situation where she might reasonably be expected to speak 
or be forthcoming with certain information, that silence might 
serve to impeach any related testimony that she later offers as 
a witness. As the Court has pointed out, "[c]ommon law tradi-
tionally h as allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previ-
ous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact 
naturally would have been asserted."116 The witness' past 
failure to state a fact is treated as evidence that the witness 
actually believes the converse of that fact to be true. 
Similarly, an individual's failure to dispute a statement 
115 For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court invalidated a s tate ordi-
nance that forced utility companies to bundle conservationist environmental litera-
ture with the bills that they mailed to their customers. The literature conflicted 
with the companies' own viewpoints and, a rgu ably, with their business interests . 
The company succeeded in hav ing the ordinance struck down on Speech Clause 
grounds because of the possibility tha t the company's silence might be interpreted 
as an endorsement of the literature. The Court found that the compa ny "may be 
forced ei ther to appear to agree with [the literature] or to res pond," and tha t the 
State cannot so "compel . . speakers to propound political messages." Pacific Gas 
& Elec. Co . v. Public Uti!. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15 -16 (1986) (plurality 
opinion). Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (r equir-
ing owner of shopping ma ll to provide access for speakers a nd disallowing Speech 
Clause claim of owner on grounds that owner "can express ly disavow any connec-
tion with the message by s imply posting signs in the a rea where the s peakers or 
h andbillers stand"); Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (disal-
lowing claim of cable operators that "mus t-carry" provisions will lead to impermis-
sible attribution of messages because, "[g]iven cable's long history of se rving as a 
cond ui t for broadcast signa ls , there appears little risk that cable vi ewers would 
assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or 
messages endorsed by the cable operator"). 
116 J enkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980). S ee also 3A J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (1970). This maxim finds an ironic and unfortunate 
counterpart in a recent se ries of cases in which the military has refused to believe 
a serv icemember's admission tha t he or she is gay without furth er "corroborating 
proof. " The military has apparently expressed a concern tha t a servicemember who 
has never before given the military any reason to believe that he or she is gay 
might ma ke such an assertion "opportunistically," as a means of getting out of a 
serv ice commitment. See SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 9. 
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that is made in his presence may sometimes constitute evi-
dence of his acqui escence in tha t statement. In particular, the 
Court has suggested that such reticence is likely to be proba-
tive where accusations of wrongdoing go unanswered. Justice 
Marshall explored this dynamic in United States u. Hale.117 
In Hale , a criminal defendant h ad refrained from offering ex-
culpatory evidence that was in his possession when the police 
first arrested him for a robbery, and the prosecution used the 
defendant's earlier silence against him when he offered that 
exculpatory evidence at trial. The Court held that the 
defendant's failure to offer exculpatory evidence during a police 
interrogation was not sufficiently probative to be used against 
him on the stand, but it went on to discuss the circumstances 
under which such a use of silence as evidence might be allow-
able. 
Silence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of 
accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances that the ac-
cused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusa-
tion. Failure to contest a n assertion, however, is considered evidence 
of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circum-
stances to object to the assertion in question. 118 
As Justice Marshall's cautionary tone suggests, the cases 
discussed in this section should not be read for the proposition 
that silence always constitutes an affirmative endorsement of 
some identity or belief. If that were so, then state officials 
could not maintain decorum at public speeches or convocations 
without threatening to "compel orthodoxy" and trench on con-
stitutional interests-a result that would be as unnecessary as 
it would be untenable .119 What cases like Hurley and 
117 422 U.S . 171 (1975). 
us !d . at 176. Of cou rse, this line of cases implicates the criminal defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right not to testify in a proceeding against him. See Grunewald 
v. United States , 353 U.S . 391 (1957) (holding tha t defendant's invoca tion of privi-
lege against sel f-incrimination before grand jury cannot be used to impeach his 
testimony at trial). These are not Speech Clause cases . None theless, the Court's 
treatment of silence as constituting an affirmative utterance in these cases relies 
upon a common understanding of social interactions and not any particular ana lyt-
ical or constitutional framewo rk . That trea tment has transubstantive implications. 
uo As Justi ce Scalia colorfu lly writes in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman , "surely 
'our social conventions' . .. have not coarsened to the point tha t anyone who does 
not stand on his chair and shout obscenities can reasonab ly be deemed to have 
assented to everything said in his presence. " Weisman, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J. , 
dissenting). 
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Weisman require is an inquiry that is sensitive to the context 
in which a contested silence appears. In Hurley, for example, 
J ustice Souter locates this inquiry in the nature of the rela-
tionship that exists between a speaker and a message. He 
writes, "[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one's own 
is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the commu-
nication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the 
m essage is compromised."120 In this formulation, it is the ex-
istence of an "intimate connection" between the speaker and 
the communication advanced that is the appropriate object of a 
careful and context-sensitive inquiry. 
Framed in more general terms, this requirement is famil-
iar to First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has fre-
quently noted that it has a responsibility to conduct a delicate 
and fact-sensitive inquiry in order to determine the import and 
meaning, in context, of the utterances that it is asked to re-
view.121 It is one of the distinctive features of the Court's 
analysis in Speech Clause cases that it conducts a de novo re-
view of findings of fact, even those made by state trial courts, 
in the course of adjudicating litigants' free speech claims. 122 
The obligation is one that "rests upon [the Court] simply be-
cause the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately de-
fined by the facts it is held to embrace."123 In Hurley, the 
Court deployed these maxims to justify its rejection of the 
Massachusetts trial court's finding that the Boston parade did 
not constitute expressive activity meriting First Amendment 
protection. 124 The Justices looked to historical, judicial and 
scholarly sources that treated parades as expressive public 
spectacles, finding that the Massachusetts courts had under-
valued the expressive importance of the Boston event. 125 
120 Hurley , 115 S. Ct. at 2348. 
12 1 See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 116 S. 
Ct. 2342, 2344 (1996) (acknowledging necessity for "fact-sensitive" review of re-
cord ). 
122 See, e.g. , New York Times Co. v . Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (holding 
that Court has obligation to "make an independent examination of the whole re-
cord ... so as to assure [itselfl that [the lower court's factual determination] does 
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression") (quotation 
omitted). 
123 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344. 
12
' See id. at 2344-46. 
125 See id. a t 2344-45 (discussing S. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWER: STREET 
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While this type of inquiry is less attractive than one that can 
rely upon bright lines and clear distinctions, that infirmity is 
endemic to the field of First Amendment analysis as a whole. 
To assert that an informed understanding of the lived expe-
rience of gay servicemembers is necessary in order properly to 
analyze the effects of the silence that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell 
policy imposes is to place that analysis squarely within a juris-
prudential tradition that the Court has elevated to the status 
of a "constitutional duty." 126 
Such an informed understanding of gay experience pro-
vides guidance in assessing the communicative weight of gay 
servicemembers' compelled silence in the face of the constant 
presumption of their heterosexuality. Justice Marshall's dictum 
in Hale makes the point aptly. "Silence gains ... probative 
weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since it is 
assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be 
more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation."127 One 
need not characterize the heterosexual presumption as an 
"accusation" to recognize that it constitutes a pervasive and 
forceful assertion about one of the most personal aspects of an 
individual's life, one that any individual would "be more likely 
than not to dispute [if it were] untrue."128 Most frequently, 
when a gay person chooses not to dispute that false presump-
tion, she is operating under some form of compulsion. 129 Of-
THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA (1986); Gregory v . Chicago, 394 
U.S. 111 (1969); and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)). 
126 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344. Justice Souter chose this phrase advisedly. As 
noted above, the Court reopens findings of fact made by federal district courts for 
de novo review in First Amendment cases, despite the clear command of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) that findings of fact made by district courts be set 
aside only if they are clearly erroneous. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The impetus for 
this overriding of a federal rule proceeds directly from the First Amendment. See 
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344. 
127 Hale, 422 U.S. at 176. 
128 ld. See also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 3 
(1990) (" 'Closetedness' itself is a performance initiated as such by the speech act 
of a silence."). 
129 For example, Professor Halley describes the plight of James Michael 
McConnell, who was fired from his job as a college librarian for refusing to re-
main silent about his relationship with another man-an action upheld by the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th 
Cir. 1971). Halley writes, "Rather than force a helpless university to blazon its 
employee's political views, the court insists that the employee must remain silent 
about them and, by semiotic default, proclaim the ubiquity and normalcy of het-
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ten, the compulsion arises from the fear of rejection and social 
disapprobation that keeps many gay people in the closet for 
large portions of their lives. In the case of the Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell policy, however, no such r eference to social forces is re-
quired, for the compulsion is the avowed purpose of the policy. 
III. T HE INTERSECTION OF AFFIRMATION AND IDENTITY 
In order to analyze a restriction on an individual's abili ty 
to give voice to h er identity-and to assess the weight of the 
burden that such a r es triction might impose by compelling h er 
to affirm a false identity-it is important to distinguish be-
tween the regulation of the modes of expressing an identity, on 
the one h and, and the regulation of identity itself, on the oth-
er. A restriction on one particular mode of expressing an iden-
tity will usually leave the speaker with ample alternative ave-
nues for identifYing herself. Thus, the silence that such a re-
striction requires ordinarily will not carry with it any forcibly 
imposed, implicit message. It is the direct regulation of an 
individual's identity that carries with it the greatest threat of a 
compelled affirmation . 
The case of Goldman v. Weinberger 130-a military First 
Amendment case-illustrates the effect of a regulation aimed 
primarily at the modes of expression of an individual identity, 
rather than the identity itself. Goldman, an ordained rabbi and 
orthodox Jew, was a doctor and officer on active duty in the 
Air Force. In 1981, he ran afoul of an Air Force dress regula-
tion that prohibited servicemembers from wearing any unau-
thorized headgear, including the yarmulke that Goldman con-
sidered a necessary part of his religious observance. 131 After 
erosexuality." Halley, supra note 5, a t 971. See also Rich, supra note 35, at 22. 
130 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
13 1 Goldman itself is framed primarily as a Free Exercise case. However, the 
Court has consis tently confl ated Speech Clause and Religio n Clause analysis in its 
military cases, applying the same nebulous standard to a ll such claims . Thus, the 
Court cites its military Speech Clause cases when conducting military Religion 
Clause analysis, see, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-07 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733 (1974)), and the Courts of Appeals have cited both types of cases, includ-
ing Goldman , in their analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. See, e.g., 
Thomasson v. Perry, SO F.3d 915 , 933 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (relying on 
Goldman in analysis of Speech Clause cla ims). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 591 (1992) ("The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and 
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receiving a reprimand and poor evaluation for the dress code 
violation, Goldman brought suit, claiming that this application 
of the code to an orthodox J ew violated the First Amendment. 
The Court, per then-Justice Rehnquist, disallowed his claim. 
The majority acknowledged that the wearing of a yarmulke 
was "required by [Goldman 's] religious beliefs" and that it con-
stituted an important expressive act by which he sought to 
identify himself as Jewish. 132 Nonetheless, they found that 
the military's interest in promoting obedience by requiring out-
ward uniformity outweighed Goldman's individual rights. 
[T]he traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms 
encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities 
in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of 
hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate individual distinctions 
except for those of rank. 133 
A holding that provides that the military may freely re-
quire soldiers to subordinate their "personal preferences and 
identities" might at first seem to present a difficult obstacle to 
a gay servicemember who seeks to challenge the Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell policy on the grounds that it forces him to affirm a 
false identity. However, recalling exactly what the Air Force 
was and was not empowered to do in Goldman places that 
apparent obstacle in perspective. The Air Force had not de-
prived Goldman of the right to identifY himself as Jewish; it 
had deprived him of one particular mode of publicly expressing 
his Jewish identity. Even after the Air Force forced him to 
comply with its uniform dress code, Goldman remained free to 
tell anyone and everyone that he was a rabbi and an orthodox 
Jew. As important as the yarmulke was to Goldman as a form 
of religious observance, it was not the only means by which he 
could make his identity known. 
To articulate the distinction in starker terms: The Air 
Force did not compel Goldman to pretend that he was Catholic. 
A regulation requiring Goldman to adopt a facade of Chris-
tianity would have been a literal "compelled orthodoxy"134-a 
worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amend-
ment .... "). 
132 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510. 
133 !d. at 508. 
13
' Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
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direct regulation of his identity-and would present a true 
parallel to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. It was not 
Goldman's identity, but the method he chose to express that 
identity, that Goldman u. Weinberger empowered the Air Force 
to regulate. Thus, under Goldman, a gay man in the military 
could probably be prohibited from wearing a button bearing a 
pink triangle and the slogan, "SILENCE=DEATH," even if he 
were profoundly committed to the fight against AIDS and 
considered the button to be a uniquely meaningful expressive 
symbol. 135 But Goldman did not empower the military to re-
quire its Jewish soldiers to attend Christmas functions, go to 
church on Sundays, and bow their heads while their peers said 
grace at mealtime, all the while remaining completely silent as 
to their true, Jewish identity. By the same token, it does not 
lend support to a policy that directly regulates the identities of 
gay servicemembers, forcing them constantly to affirm a false, 
heterosexual identity. 136 
Indeed, Professor Cover would recognize the dress regula-
tion that Goldman upheld as a natural incident of a strong 
imperial institution like the military. As Cover explains, his 
use of the term "imperial" is deliberately evocative of "the price 
that is paid in the often coercive constraints imposed on the 
autonomous realization of normative meanings."137 Cover ar-
gues, in other words, that the commitment of an individual to 
her religious, cultural or personal identity is sometimes con-
strained or muted in a strong imperial institution in order to 
secure the stabilizing benefits that such an institution has to 
offer. 138 Cover distinguishes between such "critical[ly] 
135 See generally Yoshino , supra note 29 , at 1781-93 (discussing importance of 
pink triangle as symbol in gay community); HEINZ HEGER, THE MEN WITH THE 
PINK TRIANGLE (David Fernbach trans., 1994) (documenting persecution of gay men 
during Holocaust and use of pink triangle to identify gay prisoners in Nazi con-
centration camps). 
136 In her recent Article, Professor Halley has traced the conceptual and doctrin-
al steps tha t led to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. See Halley, supra note 9. In 
what I take to be a simila r observation to my own, Halley characterizes the "Don't 
Tell" component of the policy as "a pervasive and intimate system of identity regu-
lation." Halley, supra note 9, at 179. 
137 Cover, supra note 58, at 13 n.36. 
138 As Professor Cover puts it: 
Maintaining the world is no sma ll matter and requires no less energy 
than creating it. Let loose, unfettered, the worlds created would be un-
stable and sectarian in their social organization, dissociative and incoher-
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objectiv[e]" 139 constraints on the expression of all individual 
identities, on the one hand, and the direct regulation or exclu-
sion of just certain identities, on the other. He characterizes 
the direct regulation of certain identities as a proper activity 
only for nongovernmental, sectarian communities. 140 
The Supreme Court's identity jurisprudence has taken 
shape around a similar distinction . In contrast to Goldman, 
the Court did review-and strike down-a direct regulation of 
identity by the government in Hurley u. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 141 Recall that in 
Hurley, the Court quashed an injunction requiring the .Allied 
War Veterans Council to admit the GLIB parade unit, finding 
that the effect of the injunction would be to force the Council 
to propound a message with which it disagreed. In its analysis 
of the Council's claim, the Hurley Court reproduces the assev-
erations that the Council forwarded in litigation, accepts them 
as a legitimate account of the Council's intended message, and 
bases its analysis upon that message. 142 The message consists 
primarily in the Council's definition of its own Irish identity. 
As the Court says, "a contingent marching behind the 
organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact 
that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual .... The parade's 
organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to 
be so .... "143 What the Council wished to assert, in other 
ent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions. The sober 
imperial mode of world maintenance holds the mirror of critical objectivi-
ty to meaning, imposes the discipline cf institutional justice upon norms , 
and places the constraint of peace on the void at which strong bonds 
cease. 
Cover, supra note 58, at 16. 
139 Cover, supra note 58, a t 16. 
140 See Cover, supra note 58, at 33 ("Even an accommodationist sectarian posi-
tion-one that goes to great lengths to avoid confrontation or the imposition upon 
adherents of demands that will in practice conflict with those imposed by the 
state-establishes its own meaning for the norms to which it and its members 
conform."). 
141 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995). 
142 The Court goes on, however, to disavow any req~irement that a litigant 
pressing such a claim define its intended message with a high degree of particu-
larity. See id. at 2345, 2348 ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a 
condition of constitutional protection .... [W]hatever the reason, it boils down to 
the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view . . ."). 
143 Jd . at 2348. I choose to concentrate here on the component of the Council's 
message that involves the composition of the Irish-American community rather 
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words, was that its Irish identity was a heterosexual one, un-
related to, and mutually incompatible with, homosexuality. 
Upholding the right of the Council to exercise control over 
its message concerning its Irish identity necessarily entailed 
upholding the right of the Council to control the composition of 
the parade. Since "GLIB's participation would likely be per-
ceived as having resulted from the Council's customary deter-
mination about a unit admitted to the parade,"144 the pros-
pect of a visible gay presence in the parade threatened to alter 
the Council's message by "bear[ing] witness to the fact that 
some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual."145 In order to march 
in the parade without presenting such a threat, gay and lesbi-
an Irish-Americans would have had to march "dispersed 
throughout John Hurley's crowd," as Professor Eskridge has 
put it, so that "their sexual orientation would [be] invisible to 
the audience."146 In awarding the Council a victory, the Court 
recognized that the group had a vital interest in controlling the 
public's perception of its identity as an Irishness that is natu-
rally and necessarily heterosexual. 147 The "belief' that Massa-
than the portion of its message that deals with the "social acceptance" of gay men 
and lesbians within that community, see id., because the former component focuses 
more closely on individual identity rather than on matters of political and social 
disputation. That said, there are important arguments to be made for the proposi-
tion that speech concerning gay identity is necessarily political in nature, at least 
in contemporary America. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 8, at 1440-43, 1509-13. As 
Professor Yoshino has explained, because sexual orientation is an invisible identify-
ing characteristic-one, moreover, that is collectively repressed in ordinary public 
discourse-gay identity is always already contested when it is brought out into the 
open. See Kenji Yoshino, The Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, 108 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 1998). 
144 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348. As Professor Eskridge has pointed out, the "cus-
tomary" mode of determination that the Council employed in selecting units for 
the parade was one of almost automatic acceptance. Unlike in the New York Saint 
Patrick's Day parade sponsored by the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which also 
has been the subject of a battle over gay participation, the Boston group exercised 
very little discretion in the admission of units, rejecting only four applications 
(including GLIB's) in the parade's history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Juris-
prudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and 
Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2458-59 (1997). 
145 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348; cf. Elzie v. Aspin, 897 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 
1995) ("[T]he Supreme Court made clear in [Hurley] that the statements of self-
identification of sexual orientation may contain a quite specific message .... The 
Hurley Court recognized that the statement 'I am homosexual' expresses a view-
point."). 
1
'
6 Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2461. 
147 Professor Eskridge has characterized the Council's message as one of "com-
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chusetts could not "compel" the Council to "affirm[ )"148 was a 
belief in the particular nature of the ethnic and sexual identity 
that the Council claimed for itself and its members. 
This result also entails a recognition of the operation of 
the heterosexual presumption. The marchers in the Boston 
Saint Patrick's Day parade carried no banners proclaiming the 
heterosexuali ty of the parade's organizers, its units, or its 
participants. Such banners were not necessary for the Council 
to communicate its message of heterosexual Irishness-and to 
do so in a fashion that the Court was able to recognize without 
difficulty-because a heterosexual identity is presumed to be a 
part of ordinary social interactions unless an individual choos-
es to disavow that identity explicitly. For the same reason, 
Justice Souter's reassurance that "open" gay and lesbian 
marchers were welcome in the parade depends for its logical 
coherence upon the operation of the heterosexual presump-
tion.149 It is only because the parade's audience would pre-
sume an otherwise-unidentified marcher to be heterosexual 
that individual gay and lesbian marchers could participate in 
the parade without altering the Council's message of hetero-
sexual Irishness. 150 
pulsory heterosexu a lity," see Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2459, aptly drawing 
upon the insights of Adrienne Rich that are discussed in the previous Part. S ee 
supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
"' Hurley , 115 S. Ct . a t 2347. 
149 See id. 
150 Indeed, it a ppea rs that the Court is seeking to mitigate the less attractive 
implications of the ana lytical framework it has art iculated with its suggestion that 
it was the "admiss ion of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner" 
that tru ly drove the co ntroversy in Hurley and not the mere "participation of 
openly gay, lesbian , or bisexual individuals in va rious [other] units admitted to the 
parade." Id. a t 2347 . While seemingly attractive as a means of downplaying the 
intolerance of the Co uncil's pos ition, however , the s pace that this distinction carves 
out is a very sma ll one, indeed. What could the Court mean, after a ll , when it 
suggests that the parti cipa tion of "openly" gay, lesbia n or bisexual people was not 
contested in Hurley? Does it mean for "open" to refer only to the perceptions of 
other marchers , s ugges ting that gay men and lesbians remained "free," for exam-
ple, to discuss their same-sex spouses with other parade participants, but only so 
long as they were not otherwise identifiable as gay and marched anonymously in 
the parade? Within the context of the Court's a nalysis, this constrained reading is 
necessary in order to make any sense of the assertion that "open" gay men and 
lesbians were fr ee to march. The Court could not have meant "open" to refer to 
the perceptions of the parade's audience , for it would run directly contrary to the 
logic of the opinion to a llow the State to r equire the participation of this latter 
kind of "openly gay" individual while forbiddin g the S ta te to mandate the inclusion 
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Similarly, although the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy con-
templates that gay people will serve among the ranks of the 
armed forces, it relies upon the ideological imperative of the 
heterosexual presumption to place its brand upon them. By 
forbidding expressions of gay identity in any form, at any time, 
and with any individual-including a servicemember's family 
and friends-the policy compels servicemembers constantly 
and affirmatively to express a sexual identity of the military's 
choosing. 151 Indeed, some of the servicemembers interviewed 
for this Article suggested that the heterosexual presumption 
has dominated social interactions in the military even more 
actively since the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy was put into 
place. 152 Since sexual orientation was made a matter of active 
concern in the military while the new policy was being debat-
ed, they have suggested, servicemembers are now more anx-
ious to proclaim their heterosexuality loudly-and to put pres-
sure on those around them to do the same-than they were 
of GLIB. 
If any individual marcher in the parade were identifiably gay-if he held 
hands with his same-sex partner, for example, or if he were a famous public fig-
ure who was widely known to be gay because he had come out of the closet on 
national television-then the presence of that individual would as much "bear 
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual," id. at 2348, as 
would a GLIB parade unit. Professor Eskridge makes a similar observation in 
pointing to the disturbing possibility that the Court's reasoning in Hurley could 
have been employed to exclude women or black people from the Boston parade 
altogether, since gender and racial identities are more clearly visible than is sexu-
al orientation. See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2460. The Court's opinion in 
Hurley rests on the understanding that whenever an identity is perceived to be 
present-whether that identity is implicit, like the presumed heterosexuality of the 
marchers in the Boston parade, or explicit, like a hypothetical Irish counterpart to 
Ellen DeGeneres or Congressman Barney Frank-the identity constitutes meaning-
ful and intelligible speech. 
151 See supra note 48. As Professor Halley has said, "[t]he new policy apparent-
ly provides for the discharge of servicemembers who disclose anything about their 
relationship to homosexuality--even a desire for information about it-to any· 
one--even a single individual in the apparent privacy of a therapeutic relation-
ship." Halley, supra note 9, at 181. Indeed, the military has vigorously pursued 
this avenue of investigation and subpoenaed harmful testimony from the mothers 
and fathers of servicemembers, both under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy and 
under the blanket ban that preceded it. See SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 9 
(detailing use by Navy investigators of conversations between seamen and family 
members as evidence in separation proceeding); SHILTS, supra note 70, at 99-204 
(chronicling "witch hunts" for gay and lesbian servicemembers pursued under blan-
ket exclusion). 
152 See, e.g., Benecke Interview, supra note 38. 
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under the blanket exclusion. 153 Whether or not this observa-
tion holds true as a general proposition, it remains the case 
that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy capitalizes upon the het-
erosexual presumption to enforce a direct regulation of the 
sexual identities of gay and lesbian servicemembers. 
IV. COMPELLED SILENCE AS COMPELLED AFFIRMATION 
The case of West Virginia u. Barnette, in which the Court 
struck down the practice of compulsory school flag salutes, is 
the necessary starting point for analyzing any compelled affir-
mation. Before beginning that analysis, however, a word about 
the impact of the military context on a servicemember's First 
Amendment rights is called for. The Court has frequently not-
ed-though not without dissent-that servicemembers enjoy 
reduced First Amendment protections in the military. 154 
There are some restrictions on speech that may be permissible 
in the armed forces even though they would be intolerable in 
civilian life. 155 This is no less true of Barnette-style claims 
153 See Beneke Interview, supra note 38. As Professor Halley has observed: 
In units where the 1993 revisions are vigorously or even intermittently en-
forced, ... servicemembers who want the protection of heterosexual identity 
will have to strive very hard to signify their entitlement to it-and they are 
liable to be harmed rather than helped by the volatility of the semiotic sys-
tem that the new rules provide (supposedly) for their benefit. 
Halley, supra note 9, at 219. 
154 As the Court has written: 
[W]hile members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the 
First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of 
the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The 
rights of military men must yield somewhat to meet certain overriding de-
mands of discipline and duty .... 
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (citations omitted) (quotation marks 
omitted). But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 516 n.2 (1986) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that Government restraints on First Amend-
ment rights, including limitations placed on military personnel, may be justified 
only upon showing a compelling state interest which is precisely furthered by a 
narrowly tailored regulation."). 
155 See Parker v . Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental necessity 
for obedience [in the military], and the consequent necessity for imposition of disci-
pline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitu-
tionally impermissible outside it."). But see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 
(1983) (" '[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply be-
cause they have doffed their civilian clothes.' ") (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of 
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)). 
1194 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 1141 
than it is of limitations on political advocacy156 or public dem-
onstration157-a fact of which the Barnette Court itself explic-
itly made note. 158 There are some practices in the military 
that could properly be described as "compelled affirmations" 
that are entirely appropriate and could not be call ed into ques-
tion by any useful treatment of the First Amendment. The 
r equirement that soldiers salute their superior officer s provides 
perha ps the most visible example. While the special consider-
ations that apply in the military context are as present in this 
as in any other First Amendment analysis , I choose not to 
explore the possible impact of those considerations at length 
here. The primary purpose of this Article is to analyze the 
nature of the First Amendment interest that the Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell policy burdens, not to argue that existing case law 
absolutely compels a finding that the policy is unconstitutional. 
Indeed, given the state of the Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence in the military context, no such argument is possible. 
The Court has never articulated any sort of test for the First 
Amendment claims of military personnel, relying instead on a 
form of analysis that is distinctly impressionistic .159 What is 
more, the one limitation that the Court has consistently im-
posed on the military's ability to restrict servicemembers' First 
Amendment rights is to require that any such restriction be 
applied in a neutral and evenhanded fashion.160 The Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell policy, which targets only the identities of gay 
156 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S . 348 (1980) (upholding r egul a tion prohibiting 
members of Air Force from distributing written material on base without prior 
consent of superior officer); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (affirming convic-
tion of Army captain who encouraged subordinates to refuse to fight in Vietnam 
because of racial discrimination in troop assignments). 
157 See Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding Army regu lations allow-
ing commanders to prohibit partisan political demonstrations on Army property 
othenvise open to civilian traffic). 
158 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S . 624, 642 n.19 
(1943) ("The Nation may raise armies and compel citizens to give military ser-
vice .... It fo llows, of course, that those subject to military discipline are under 
m a ny duties and may not cla im many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to 
those in civilian life."). 
159 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 528 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting) ("The Court rejects 
Captain Goldman's claim without even the slightest attempt to weigh his asserted 
right to the free exercise of his religion against the interest of the Air Force in 
uniformity of dress within the military hospital. No test for free exercise claims in 
the military contex t is even articula ted, much less applied."). 
160 See supra note 69 , and cases cited therein. 
1 
1997] U.S. MILITARY'S DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL POLICY 1195 
and lesbian servicemembers, clearly fails to satisfy this basic 
limitation. Thus, I limit the focus of this Article to the nature 
of the burden that the policy inflicts under West Virginia u. 
Barnette and leave the ultimate question of the policy's consti-
tutionality to the federal judiciary. 
Barnette involved a challenge to a V./est Virginia law 16 1 
that required all students, in both public and private schools, 
to participate in courses on civics and government that includ-
ed a mandatory salute and pledge of allegiance to the Ameri-
can flag. 162 The Court had recently upheld the practice of re-
quiring such a pledge in the case of Minersville School District 
u. Gobitis, 163 assuming its propriety as a general matter and 
declining to afford an exemption on religious grounds to the 
litigants before it. The appellees in Barnette , like the claimants 
in Gobitis, were adherents to the Jehovah's Witness religion. 
They sought to convince the Court that they merited the reli-
gious exemption that the Court had previously declined to 
extend. The Court, however, handed the appellees an even 
broader victory, overruling its decision in Gobitis and striking 
down the compulsory flag salute statute, in its entirety, on 
Speech Clause grounds. 164 
The Court's language throughout Barnette is expansive 
and its reliance on precedent sparse, 165 reflecting both the 
16 1 See W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941). 
162 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.l. The pledge, which should be familiar to 
anyone educated in an American public school, reads as follows: "I pledge alle-
giance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which 
it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." ld. at 628-629. 
The words "under God," were added to the pledge at a later time. 
163 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
164 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The recent currency of Gobitis made the 
Barnette Court's decision to overrule that case noteworthy in its own right. Indeed, 
the Court heard the case on appeal from a district court panel that had ruled for 
the petitioners on the more narrow grounds that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired West Virginia to accommodate their religious beliefs. See id. at 630. Com-
mentators frequently invoke Barnette in discussing the principle of stare decisis 
and the propriety of overruling recent, controlling precedent. See, e.g., Charles 
Alan Wright, My Favorite Opinion-The Second Flag-Salute Case, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1297, 1297 (1996). 
165 Aside from the Gobitis case itself, Justice Jackson cites only two cases in-
volving free speech and freedom of conscience in his entire majority opinion: Ham-
ilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), which upheld the right of the State to pre-
scribe military training for students at public universities, and Stromberg u. Cali-
fornia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in which the Court held that the display of a red flag 
as a symbol of opposition constituted speech meriting First Amendment protection. 
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importance and the novelty of the First Amendment interest 
that the Court recognized in the case. 166 In framing the na-
ture of that claim, the Court extended the reach of its "free 
speech" protection beyond the realm of simple speech or sym-
bolic conduct and embraced freedom of conscience as a value 
lying at the core of the First Amendment. 
[T]he compulsory f1ag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a 
belief and an attitude of mind .... To S'Jstain the compulsory flag 
salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the 
individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public au-
thorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. 157 
At best, the Court found, such a compulsory exercise would 
force the appellees to "simulate assent by words without belief 
and by a gesture barren of meaning"168 through an affirma-
tion that they could disclaim after the exercise was over. At 
worst, it would force them to "forego any contrary convictions 
of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed 
ceremony."169 Either way, the result was the same: The stat-
ute imposed a burden on individual rights that was greater 
even than that imposed by "censorship or suppression of ex-
pression of opinion" 170-a burden that could be warranted on-
ly "on even more immediate and urgent grounds"171 than the 
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632-33. 
166 Barnette was decided during World War II, and anxiety over totalitarianism 
clearly served to inspire some of the Court's stirring rhetoric. Indeed, the Court 
devotes some text and a paragraph-long footnote to the question of how closely the 
physical component of the fl ag salute resembles the obeisances that Adolf Hitler 
required of the German people under Nazism, see Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627-28 & 
n.3, and it draws an explicit contrast between its holding in Barnette and the 
strategies of "our present totalitarian enemies." See id. at 641. Similarly, Justice 
Frankfurter, writing in lone dissent, makes claims for moral authority by begin-
ning with a reminder that, as a Jew, he "belongs to the most vilified and perse-
cuted minority in history." See id. at 646 (Frankfurter , J., dissenting). Even the 
Civil War was apparently weighing upon the Justices' minds in Barnette, as evi-
denced by their acknowledgment of the types of disagreement that the choice of 
terms in the pledge might be expected to provoke. See id. at 634 n .14 ("Use of 
'Republic,' if rendered to di stinguish our government from a 'democracy,' or the 
words 'one Nation,' if intended to distinguish it from a 'federation,' open up old 
and bitter controversies in our political history .... "). 
167 Id . at 633-34. 
168 Jd. a t 633. 
, •• Id . 
170 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633. 
171 Id. At the time the Court decided Barnette, the clear and present danger 
test still predominated in First Amendment analysis. S ee, e.g., id. ("[C]ensorship or 
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grounds that other speech restrictions would require. Rejecting 
the claim that the need for "national unity" as "the basis of 
national security"172 could provide the requisite urgency, Jus-
tice Jackson articulated a broad condemnation of those who 
would seek to compel orthodoxy and radical uniformity in the 
service of a coerced unanimity: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 173 
The core principles of Barnette have found wide applica-
tion. Following its determination that the regulation of corpo-
rate speech is subject to the same kind of scrutiny as the regu-
lation of an individual's speech/74 for example, the Court has 
prohibited government from forcing corporations to propound 
messages with which they disagree. In Pacific Gas & Electric 
v. Public Utilities Commission, 175 a California utility company 
successfully argued that the State could not force it to include 
environmentalist literature with the newsletter that it sent 
with its customers' monthly bills. "Were the government freely 
able to compel corporate speakers to propound political mes-
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the 
expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is 
empowered to prevent and punish."); see also Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919) ("The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent.") (Holmes, J.). The Barnette Court's holding that compelled affirmations may 
be justified only on a showing of "even more immediate and urgent grounds," 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633, indicates, within the language that framed First 
Amendment analysis at the time, the uniquely high degree of scrutiny that such 
affirmations must receive. 
172 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595). 
173 !d. at 642. 
174 See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("[Politi-
cal speech] is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, 
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than 
an individual."). In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that 
placed restrictions on the efforts of corporations to influence the outcome of popu-
lar referenda. See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm'n of Cal., 475 
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in 
determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like 
individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of informa-
tion and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster.") (citation omitted). 
175 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
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sages with which they disagree," the Court found, the 
protections of the First Amendment "would be empty, for the 
government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that 
which they deny in the next." 176 Barnette has also worked in 
tandem with the Court's determination that the use of money 
for political advocacy constitutes expressive activity that merits 
F ir st A111endment protection. 117 The case of Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education 178 es tablished the proposition that work-
ers cannot be forced, as a condition of their employment, to 
contr ibute money to a union when that money will be used for 
political advocacy that is unrelated to the union's role as a 
bargaining representative. 1 7 ~ The "freedom of belief' that 
Barnette protects is , the Court said in Abood, is "no less appli-
cable"180 to such compulsory expenditures. 
The most significant reaffirm ation of Barnette as it applies 
to the individual's interest in personal expression is ·wooley v. 
Maynard. 18 1 Wooley concerned the placement of a state motto 
on an automobile license plate . The plaintiffs, George and 
Maxine Maynard, were residents of the State of New Hamp-
shire. Since 1969, that state h as required vehicles to carry 
license plates displaying the state's official motto, "Live Free or 
Die."182 The Maynards , who were adherents to the Jehovah's 
Witness religion, 183 objected to being forced to display the 
motto on their car and brought suit to enjoin the state from 
prosecuting them for their repeated attempts to cover the mot-
to with tape. The Supreme Court granted the Maynards their 
injunction, grounding its holding firmly in the principles it first 
176 Id . a t 16. 
177 See Buckley v . Va leo, 424 U.S . 1, 22-23 (1976) (per curiam) (" Making a 
contribution .. . enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance 
of common political goals ... [and so) implicates fun damental Firs t Amendment 
interests. "); see a lso Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (reaf-
firming principle that "contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading 
a political message is protected by the Fi rst Amendment"). 
178 43 1 U.S. 209 (1977). 
179 S ee id . at 234-35. 
180 Id. at 235. 
181 430 U.S. 705 (1977 ). 
182 See id. at 706. 
183 Thankfully, the Court has never made any s uggestion that the Barnette line 
of cases applies only to confirmed Jehovah's Witnesses. Cf. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992 ); Heffron v. International Soc'y 
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
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articulated in Barnette. In particular, the Court reiterated that 
the First Amendment protects "freedom of thought"184 as well 
as the freedom to engage in various forms of speech and con-
duct. "The right to speak and the right to refrain from speak-
ing," it said, "are complementary components of the broader 
concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' "185 While the Court 
recognized that "the affirmative act of a flag salute [that was 
compelled in Barnette] involved a more serious infringement 
upon per sonal liberties than the passive act of carrying the 
state motto on a license plate," the latter requirement nonethe-
less "force[d] an individual . . . to be an instrument for foster-
ing public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable." The State may not, the Court held, so "invade [] 
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all offi-
cial control."186 
The extent to which a forced message touches upon mat-
ters of conscience or intimate personal concern is the question 
with which Barnette and its progeny are, ultimately, the most 
concerned. That consideration almost certainly drives the indi-
vidual speaker's indignation in most Barnette claims. But such 
an interest is also, by its very nature, defined in wholly subjec-
tive terms. In Hurley, for example, the parade organizers' sim-
ple assertion that the compelled affirmation occasioned by 
GLIB's participation violated their deeply held personal beliefs 
concerning Irish sexuality was sufficient to support a Barnette 
claim, despite the absence of any measurable external indicia 
of their demonstrated commitment to those beliefs. 187 Thus, 
although the dissonance between the speaker's beliefs and the 
content of a compelled affirmation is the engine that drives the 
Barnette doctrine, it does not provide a useful way of assessing 
the relative seriousness of the burdens that different compelled 
affirmations place upon involuntary speakers. For that, it is 
necessary to develop more objective criteria with which to 
compare such claims. 
18
" Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (1977). 
185 Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (Murphy, J., concurring)). See supra, 
text accompanying notes 94- 95. 
186 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (Murphy, J., con-
curring)). 
187 See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2459-60. 
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Together, Barnette and Wooley suggest at least two axes 
along which the seriousness of the burden imposed by a com-
pelled affirmation may be measured: the degree of linkage (or 
attenuation) that exists between the message and the speaker; 
and the opportunity available to the speaker to make clear to 
others her disagreement with the message she is forced to 
propound. The first of these may be called the "intimacy ax-
is"-the measure of how personally or intimately the speaker 
is implicated by a compelled affirmation. The second we can 
call the "dissension axis"-the measure of the opportunity that 
the involuntary speaker retains to make known her disagree-
ment with the message. 188 The compelled affirmations in 
Barnette and Wooley are essentially complementary in the 
manner in which they play out along these two axes. 
In Barnette, there was no attenuation at all between the 
mandatory pledge of allegiance and the individual student; 
rather, the message was both immediate and personal. The 
pledge itself was couched in solemn and earnest terms, and the 
student was required both to speak the pledge out loud and to 
accompany it with a salute indicating her sincerity in the 
words that she spoke. On the other hand, there was ample 
opportunity for the students in Barnette to make known to 
others their disagreement with the pledge. Since the pledge 
was conducted before classmates and teachers with whom the 
students interacted on a daily basis, they could quite effective-
ly qualify their participation in the pledge with explanations to 
their peers that they were participating involuntarily and that 
the pledge ran counter to their own beliefs. 189 Thus, it appar-
188 This attempt to develop objectively quantifiable a.xes ahng which to measure 
the seriousness of a compelled affirmation bears some similarity to Professor 
Rubenfeld's attempt, in his privacy analysis, to use objective criteria to describe 
the extent to which a regulation "takes over" an individual's life. See Rubenfeld, 
supra note 81, at 784. Rubenfeld does briefly discuss Barnette in his Article, but 
he takes great pains to distinguish laws concerning speech and expression from 
the privacy rights that he seeks to address. See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 784-
87. Rubenfeld's anxiety over the proximity of Barnette and its progeny to his own 
theory probably signals his desire to limit the scope of his theory and to insulate 
it from the charge that it will lead to an explosion of "newly discovered" constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 785 ("Because of the signal 
role that speech plays in political freedom and because of the express constitution-
al guarantee, government in this country can hardly forbid or compel citizens to 
utter a single opinion without violating their rights."). 
189 Recall that the Barnette Court did not consider it important w determine 
I 
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ently was the weight of the burden imposed under the inti-
macy axis that drove the Court's decision in Barnette. 
In Wooley, the degree of linkage, or intimacy, between 
speaker and message was less than that in Barnette, but the 
speakers were less able to qualify their apparent endorsement 
of the contested message. In addressing the former consider-
ation, the Court noted the contrast between the "affirmative 
act of a flag salute" and the "passive act of carrying the state 
motto on a license plate" when it acknowledged that, between 
the two requirements, the motto constituted the less "serious 
infringement."190 To render the distinction between the two 
more precisely: The Maynards were not required to speak the 
motto themselves but only to carry it on their property; thE.: 
motto was couched in considerably less personal terms than 
was the pledge, employing a collective "we" rather than a sol-
emn "I"; and the motto's ubiquity and its rather inauspicious 
placement on a license plate diminished the extent to which it 
would ever be perceived as the personal averment of any indi-
vidual speaker, the Maynards included. On the other hand, the 
Maynards did not have the opportunity personally to disclaim 
their endorsement of the State's motto to all the motorists and 
pedestrians who would regularly see them displaying it-their 
ability to expressly dissent was curtailed. 191 They could cer-
tainly have placed a bumper sticker on their car with some 
sort of express disclaimer, but common sense suggests that 
such an item would be neither very practical nor very effective 
whether the statute before it required the students actually to believe the words 
that they spoke or merely to recite them along with their classmates. See 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 ("It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates 
that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling 
converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simu-
late assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning."). Cf. 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16 (government cannot "require speakers to 
affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next"). 
190 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
191 Compare id. ("New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use 
their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological mes-
sage .... As a condition to driving an automobile ... the Maynards must dis-
play 'Live Free or Die' to hundreds of people each day.") with id. at 717 n.l5 ("It 
has been suggested that today's holding will be read as sanctioning the oblitera-
tion of the national motto, 'In God We Trust', from United States coins and cur-
rency. . . . [However,] [c]urrency is generally carried in a purse or pocket and 
need not be displayed to the public."). 
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and would make for a somewhat ridiculous spectacle in any 
event. Thus, although the burden that the New Hampshire 
statute imposed was lesser in "degree"192 than that associated 
with the compulsory flag salute in Barnette, the weight of that 
burden under the dissension axis was sufficient to allow the 
Maynards to prevail. 
When measured along these two axes, the affirma tions of 
heterosexual identity that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy 
compels from gay servicemembers exhibit the worst charac-
teristics of each of the affirmations in Barnette and Wooley. 
Concerning the intimacy axis, the link between speaker and 
message under the policy could not be more close . The facade 
of heterosexuality that the policy requires gay servicemembers 
to maintain serves to define the public identities by which they 
are known, implicating every aspect of their social interactions. 
Concerning the dissension axis, there is no opportunity for gay 
servicemembers ever to make known their "disagreement" with 
the heterosexual identity that the policy forces them to pro-
pound.193 Moreover, the only neutral disclaimer that one can 
imagine a gay servicemember making-that is, a disclaimer 
that would not violate the terms of the policy-would be the 
repeated assertion, whenever a conversation carried intima-
tions of a presumption of heterosexuality, that the 
servicemember "does not mean by her participation in this 
conversation to imply anything about her sexual orientation," 
or words to that effect. Even to frame the suggestion in words 
demonstrates how impractical any such disclaimer would be. 
More to the point, such a stultified and unnatural conversa-
tional handicap would reveal a servicemember's homosexuality 
almost as quickly as would a bald assertion of her sexual ori-
entation.194 In Hurley, the Court noted the unworkability of 
192 Id. at 715. 
193 Recall that even those statements that a servicemember makes to her family 
and non-military friends can serve, without more, as the basis for a separation 
proceeding under the policy. See supra notes 48, 151 and accompanying text. The 
policy forces servicemembers to proclaim a false heterosexua l identity, without 
qualification, at all times and to a ll people. 
19
'
1 See Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp. 850, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("It is unlikely in 
the extreme that any enlisted member fit to serve would believe that closeted 
homosexuals are not serving or would long retain that belief after asking another 
enlisted member his or her sexua l orientation and receiving the rep ly 'no com-
ment.' "). 
_ _] 
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any express disclaimer on the part of the parade organizers in 
its analysis of their Barnette claim, concluding, "Practice fol-
lows practicability here, for such disclaimers would be quite 
curious in a moving parade."195 In this respect, "practice fol-
lows practicability" under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy as 
well. 
The Court singled out compelled affirmations for categori -
cally different treatment in West Virginia u. Barnette, finding 
that they imposed an even greater burden on an individual's 
First Amendment rights than do censorship and other straight-
forward restrictions on speech and advocacy 196- t he 
paradigmatic infringements on freedom of expression against 
which we have traditionally understood the First Amendment 
to offer protection. Even within that unique category of 
disfavored state regulation, the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is 
extreme. The damage that the policy's compelled affirmations 
of heterosexual identity inflict on the personal autonomy of gay 
and lesbian servicemembers is more pervasive, more unrelent-
ing and less subject to mitigation than any compelled affirma-
tion that the Supreme Court has thus far been called upon to 
reVIew. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began by using an imaginary conversation to 
illustrate its central thesis. Perhaps a second hypothetical will 
serve as an appropriate conclusion in order to account for the 
failure of the Federal Courts of Appeals to understand the 
nature of the First Amendment interest that the Don't Ask, 
195 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. 
Ct. 2338, 2349 (1995). Compare, also, the Court's reaction in P.G & E. to the 
environmental group's suggestion that the inclusion of a disclaimer on its material 
would prevent any misattribution of its views to P.G. & E. and so would eliminate 
the Barnette problem: 
The presence of a disclaimer on TURN's messages does not suffice to elimi-
nate the impermissible pressure on appellant to respond to TURN's speech. 
The disclaimer serves only to avoid giving readers the mistaken impression 
that TURN's words are really those of appellant. It does nothing to reduce 
the risk that appellant will be forced to respond when there is strong dis-
agreement with the substance of TURN's message. 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S . at 16 n .ll (citations omitted). 
196 See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text. 
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Don't Tell policy burdens . The Second, Fourth , Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have relied upon what might most charitably be 
described as a lawyer's argument in conducting their analysis. 
They have reasoned that the policy merely uses a gay 
servicemember's statement of her identity as evidence-that is, 
evidence that she probably stands in violation of the policy's 
prohibition on exhibiting a "propensity" to engage in homosex-
u al acts. 197 Because there is a "strong[] correlation . . . be-
tween those who state that they are homosexuals and those 
who are at least likely to engage in [homosexual] acts,"198 
these courts have explained, the policy's evidentiary use of 
identity speech is an entirely rational one. That being so, they 
have concluded, the policy presents no problem under the First 
Amendment so long as the underlying conduct restriction is 
valid. 199 It is time, finally, to dispel the apparent magic of 
197 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (Supp. 1997); Able, 88 F.3d at 1296. On the formal 
definition of the term "propensity," see DoD Directive No. 1332. 14, encl. 3, pr. 1, 
at H.l.b(2) ("propensity" is "more than an abstract preference to engage in homo-
sexua l acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or will engage in 
homosexual acts"); Able, 88 F.3d a t 1297-98 (deferring to government's definition 
of "propensity" as indicating "likelihood" of engaging in proscribed conduct). 
198 Able, 88 F.3d at 1296. See also Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930 ("Such remarks 
provide evidence of activity that the military may validly proscribe."); Richenberg, 
97 F.3d at 262 (adopting Fourth Circuit's reasoning) . 
199 See Able, 88 F.3d at 1296 n.8, 1300 (stressing contingent nature of this First 
Amendment argument and remanding to district court for ruling on constitutional-
ity of underlying conduct restriction). 
Judge Kenneth Hall issued a vigorous dissent in Thomasson u. Perry. His 
opinion, which was joined by Judges Ervin, Michael and Motz , criticizes the policy 
primarily on equal protection grounds. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949- 52 (Hall, J., 
dissenting). Judge Hall takes aim at the validity of any restriction that purports 
to rest on a distinction between sexual orientation and a "propensity" to engage in 
broadly defined affectionate behavior. Arguing that this strained distinction has 
nothing to do with " 'conduct' in any ordinary sense of the word," id. at 950, 
Judge Hall concludes that Lt. Thomasson was discharged "only because he has 
said that he is homosexual." Id. In other words, Judge Hall argues, the policy sin-
gles out servicemembers based on status alone, an action that is highly suspect 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Regarding the First Amendment implications of 
the Navy's action, Judge Hall suggests that the only evidentiary value that 
Thomasson's "admission" possessed was with respect to his sexual orientation, and 
not with respect to any conduct that could legitimately have served as a basis for 
his discharge from the Navy. See id. at 953-54. The government's only possible 
response to this objection, the Judge argues, is to "defin e [the] speech as 'con-
duct. "' Id. at 954. At that point, the statute must be understood to "be targeted a t 
suppressing the speech itself," and doing so for the impermissible purpose of ac-
commodating "the prejud ices of heterosexual servicemen." Id. Judge Ha ll concludes 
that, when the disingenuity of the distinction between homosexual "status" and a 
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this speech-as-evidence argument. 
Imagine for a moment that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell stat-
ute gave a somewhat more narrow definition of the statements 
that constitute sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that 
an individual stands in violation of the "propensity" restriction . 
Suppose the statute provided that gay and lesbian soldiers 
remain free to identify themselves honestly, with no adverse 
effects, and that only statements indicating that a soldier actu-
ally intends to commit a "homosexual act" would raise the 
damning presumption. Thus, if an openly gay servicemember 
revealed to a friend that he planned to have a romantic en-
counter, or if he spoke excitedly of his plans to visit a brothel 
in a foreign port-if, in other words, the servicemember said 
anything to suggest that he was actively seeking to engage in a 
"homosexual act"-then the military could take this as suffi-
cient evidence of the servicemember's "propensity" and initiate 
separation proceedings accordingly. A servicemember's mere 
acknowledgment that he was gay, however, would not trigger 
the policy, and all servicemembers would remain equally free 
to make their respective sexual orientations known whenever 
the occasion to do so might arise. 
If the statute provided for this somewhat more refined 
strategy for enforcing the "propensity" restriction, then the 
policy would no longer compel gay servicemembers to affirm a 
false identity. 200 Nonetheless, if an openly gay servicemember 
"propensity" to engage in ordinary affectionate behavior is revealed, the speech-as-
evidence argument simply becomes inapplicabl e. 
The project of this Article is to analyze the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy as it 
is written, to demonstrate the burden that the policy-by its own terms-places on 
the speech interests of gay and lesbian servicemembers, and to point out the inad-
equacy of the a na lytical framework offered by the Second, Fourth, Eighth and 
N inth Circuits to recognize and describe that burden. Judge Hall's dissent in 
Thomasson takes aim a t the very consistency and coherence of the policy's found a-
tions. The Judge calls into question, not the adequacy, but the propriety of the 
majority's First Amendment analysis, arguing that the disingenuous and spurious 
nature of the status/propensity distinction renders the speech-as-evidence argument 
unavailable to the government. Judge Hall certainly has not been alone in making 
this argument. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 9, a t 183-218; Halley, supra note 9, at 
220 ("We need to be able to describe the discriminations of the new military anti-
gay policy in terms of the relationship between status and conduct, not by occlud-
ing one or the other."). The fact that this Article has chosen an approach that 
differs from Judge Ha ll 's should in no way be read as a repudia tion of his power-
ful attack on the legitim acy of the policy and the motives that underlie it. 
200 I do not mean to sugges t that the r egime outlined in this hypothetical is a 
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living under this hypothetical policy were to tell a friend that 
she planned to have a romantic encounter, and the military 
used her statements as the basis for initiating a separation 
proceeding, the speech-as-evidence argument might well suffice 
to overcome any objection she might raise that this use of her 
statements impermissibly restricted her freedom of expres-
sion201-assuming, as always, tha t the double standard for 
conduct and "propensity" that underlies the policy is itself val-
id. 202 The availability of the speech-as-evidence argument has 
nothing to do with the question of whether the policy compels 
gay servicemembers to make false affirmations of their sexual 
identity. By the same token, when the policy does compel gay 
servicemembers to make such false affirmations, the speech-as-
evidence argument does not serve to justify or mitigate the 
burdens associated with those compelled affirmations. The two 
analytical approaches simply address different First 
Amendment questions. Thus, it is not a contradiction to ob-
serve that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy compels gay 
servicemembers to make false affirmations of their sexual 
identities at the same time that it provides for what might 
otherwise be a permissible evidentiary use of their statements. 
It is, rather, another way of demonstrating that the very defi-
nition of the conduct/propensity restriction, and the statements 
that constitute sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that 
the restriction has been violated, constitute the mechanism by 
which the policy compels gay servicemembers to make these 
false affirmations. 203 
des irable one. While it would cons titute an improvement over the current policy, it 
would still punish a gay servicemember for conduct (and statements) that would 
be en tirely permissible for a straight servicemember, and it would do so solely on 
the basis of the gay servicemember's sexual orientation. Such a policy raises seri-
ous questions under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. 
201 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489-91 (1993) (reaffirmin g principle 
tha t "[t]he First Amendment .. . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech 
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent" and upholding 
sentencing enhancement provision on grounds that it did not have effect of chilling 
protected speech). 
202 See Able, 88 F.3d at 1296 n.8, 1299. 
203 This observation has implications that far exceed the scope of this Article. 
For a deeper exploration of those implications, it is necessary to turn to the work 
of Professor Halley, who has written extensively on the relationship between act 
and identity-in particular , the relationship between sodomy and homosexual iden-
~· 
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For this reason, the mode of analysis that the various 
Circuits have employed in their review of the policy is radically 
incomplete . None of these reviewing courts has recognized the 
expressive power of the silence that the policy compels gay 
servicemembers to maintain; none has analyzed the manner in 
which the policy compels gay servicemembers constantly to 
affirm a heterosexual identity. 204 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit 
panel that issued Richenberg u. Perry disposed of Captain 
Richard Richenberg's First Amendment clai:rn.s in a section 
that measured only two short paragraphs.205 That panel be-
gan its Speech Clause analysis with the follow-ing observation. 
Under the prior policy, the military asked applicants if they were 
tity-in exploring the powerful change that Bowers u. Hardwick worked upon the 
legal landscape for gay, lesbian and bisexual people. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 
5. Halley has repeatedly challenged the reflexive assumption that sodomy-or any 
particular sexual act-is properly definitive of the class of "homosexuals." Rather, 
she argues, "[t]he patterns that emerge from recent empirical and theoretical work 
on the subject compel the conclusion that homosexual identity, far from being the 
equivalent of sodomy, is constituted in precisely the political process which, under 
the equal protection clause, the courts are pledged to protect." Halley, supra note 
5, at 923. 
204 In contrast, Judge Eugene Nickerson of the Federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York has evinced a deeper understanding of how the 
policy operates. Judge Nickerson wrote the opinion that the Second Circuit re-
versed in Able. See Able v. U.S., 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), reu'd and 
remanded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d. Cir. 1996). While he rested his First Amendment 
analysis on a rejection of the status/propensity distinction, see icl., at 973-76-an 
approach similar to that adopted by Judge Hall in Thomasson , 80 F.3d at 
930--Judge Nickerson's discussion of the government's unit cohesion argument dis-
played a welcome sensitivity to the degree of deception that is inherent in the 
policy. As the Judge wrote, "[c]ommon sense suggests that a policy of secrecy, 
indeed what might be called a policy of deception or dishonesty, will call unit 
cohesion into question." Able, 880 F. Supp. at 979. ,Judge Hall acknowledged the 
wisdom of this observation in his Thomasson dissent. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 
952 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
On remand, Judge Nickerson again struck down the policy, this time on equal 
protection grounds. In that opinion, the judge made a similar point without minc-
ing words: 
For the United States government to require those self-identifying as 
homosexuals to hide their orientation and to pretend to be heterosexuals 
is to ask them to accept a judgment that their orientation is in itself 
disgraceful and they are unfit to serve. To impose such a degrading and 
deplorable condition for remaining in the Armed Services cannot in fair-
ness be justified on the ground that the truth might arouse the prejudice 
of some of their fellow members. 
Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp 850, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
205 See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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homosexual and excluded those who answered affirmatively. The 
new policy is less restrictive-the military now ignores the issue 
unless a service-member affirmatively evidences a propensity to en-
gage in conduct inconsistent with military service. 206 
Any court that concludes, after purportedly conducting a 
searching First Amendment inquiry, that the forcibly imposed 
closet of the new policy is "less restrictive" of servicemembers' 
speech interests than was the blanket exclusion that preceded 
it, betrays a lack of understanding of the lived experience of 
gay and lesbian servicemembers that is inexcusable. 207 If this 
Article has one purpose, it is to help to eliminate this species 
of privileged ignorance. 208 
Gay servicemembers did suffer many of the injuries and 
indignities that this Article has described in equal measure 
under the blanket exclusion that preceded the Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell policy. Some gay people, when presented with an official 
policy of exclusion, chose to hide their identities and enter the 
military even though they knew that, in theory, they were not 
supposed to be there. Others came to realize that they were 
gay only after committing themselves to a life and a career in 
military service. 209 In many cases, the harms that the old pol-
206 Id. at 263. 
207 See also Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136 (opining that, even when servicemembers 
are discharged for nothing more than identifying themselves as gay, "the First 
Amendment is not implicated."); Able, 88 F.3d at 1299-1300 (characterizing policy 
as creating "a reasonable balance" between "a service member's privacy interest 
and the military interest in prohibiting homosexual acts"). 
208 See Yoshino, supra note 29, at 1788-93 (discussing costs of "carefully culti-
vated" judicial ignorance of gay people and gay life); Sedgwick, supra note 18, at 
23. 
209 Allan Berube discusses this dynamic in his pathbreaking investigation into 
the experiences of gay servicemembers during World War II. Berube's description 
of the "psychological screening" process that the armed forces used in its attempt 
to exclude gay people (and others who were "mentally unbalanced") provides a 
good example of the hapless position in which young servicemembers often found 
themselves then, and continue to now. Psychological "screeners" in the post-World 
War I era regularly asked inductees, with varying degrees of directness, whether 
they were gay. See BERUBE, supra note 74, at 8-32. Berube explains that many 
inductees simply had not yet confronted the issue: 
Gay selectees who said 'no' sometimes believed that they were telling 
the truth. Some did not yet think of themselves as gay. In early 1942, 
right after Pearl Harbor was bombed, twenty-year-old Woodie Wilson 
enlisted in the Air Force at an induction station outside Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, where, he recalled, "I was asked the big question, 'Are you 
a homosexual?' And I certainly said 'no' and didn't believe I was." Others 
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icy inflicted were the direct result of the military's abusively 
selective enforcement of the blanket exclusion.2 10 Even when 
the military did not deliberately abuse its authority, the impos-
sibility of perfect enforcement--or even reasonably consistent 
enforcement--of a policy that sought to exclude a class of peo-
could truthfully say no because they had not yet had any sexual experi-
ences . . . . Still others had never heard the clinical term homosexual 
before and guessed that it didn't apply to them. "Going into the service 
the word 'homosexual' was used," recalled Raymond Mailloux, who in 
July 1943 was drafted into the Army in Fall River, Massachusetts , at the 
age of eighteen. "And like everyone else, of course, I said 'no'. Because I 
truly did not know what 'homosexual' meant. We didn 't call it that. We 
called it more or less being 'queer' or 'fruit.' And it wasn't even till later 
that I knew it pertained to women also." 
Id. at 23-24. 
Coming to terms with one's sexuality and embracing an adult identity is a 
complicated process , a nd many of us do not complete the task before being con-
fronted with important life decisions, including the decision of whether to join the 
military. This is no less true of the servicemembers who agreed to be interviewed 
for this Article . Among those who have already been introduced in the sections 
above, neither Elizabeth Hillman nor Anonymous Officer Number One knew that 
she was gay at the time that each entered her respective branch of the armed 
forces. See Hillman Interview, supra note 34; Anonymous Interview Number One, 
supra note 35; text accompanying note 213, infra. Indeed, as Michelle Benecke 
points out, coming to terms with questions about one's sexuality is made all the 
more difficult when one enters an environment where even discussing the issue 
can result in immediate discharge. See Benecke Interview, supra note 38. 
210 The story of Sergeant Perry Watkins provides one of the most extraordinary 
examples of this kind of selective enforcement. His saga is told in grea t detail in 
Conduct Unb ecoming. See SHILTS, supra note 70, at 61-63, 79-80, 161- 62, 218-19, 
230, 241-43 , 395-98. Watkins was inducted into the Army in 1968. From the first, 
he openly told anyone who might wish to know that he was gay, including the 
psychiatrist who conducted his induction interview. Even so, the Army did not ini-
tially a ttempt to bar Watkins from service; quite the contrary, it actively sought 
out his "non-heterosexual" services. \Vatkins was an accomplished drag queen, and 
the Army enthusiastically employed him during the Vietnam War to entertain the 
troops. The Army also repeatedly attempted to drum Watkins out of the service 
over the years because he was gay, periodically "discovering" this damning piece of 
information whenever it was convenient. Watkins' tenure in the Army is an almost 
comic series of smash-hit, Army-sponsored performances as the fabulous "Simone" 
interspersed with career-threa tening discharge proceedings. 
When the Army finally tried to kick Watkins out of the service once and for 
all, Watkins brought suit in federal court to fight his discharge. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, found the Army's course of conduct so outra-
geous that they applied an estoppel and refused to allow the military to use the 
fact that Watkins was gay as grounds for his discharge-an unprecedented use of 
this kind of equitable remedy against the military. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane). 
Sergeant Watkins died of complications resulting from the AIDS virus on 
March 17, 1996. See N.Y. TIMES, March 21 , 1996, at 5. 
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ple on the basis of an invisible characteristic left gay 
servicemembers constantly exposed and vulnerable. It is for 
these and many other reasons that a blanket exclusion of gay 
people from a plur alistic State institution like the military 
raises serious questions under the equal protection component 
of the Fifth &-nendment to the Constitution, particularly fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's r ecent decision in Romer v. Ev-
ans.ztt 
Vvhatever else may be said about the blanket exclusion, 
however, it never purported to embrace the infliction of such 
harms upon gay servicemembers as the intended mode of the 
policy's operation, never codified the infliction of such harms 
into the letter of a regulation or statute. That is what the 
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has done. By inviting gay people to 
serve in the armed forces but compc;lling them to lie about the 
most personal aspects of their identities, the new policy places 
the power of the State behind an offense to servicemembers' 
First Amendment rights that the military could previously 
argue that most gay servicemembers were imposing upon 
themselves. That compulsion, and the harms that attend it, 
are now written into the definitions that drive the statute. 212 
2 11 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See also Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't. of Defense, 34 F.3d 
1469, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Construing the [blanket ban] to apply to the 'classifi-
cation of being homosexual' clearly implicates equal protection."); Able v. United 
States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (characterizing as "weak" the argu-
ment that "sexual tens ions" engendered by mere presence of openly gay 
servicemembers might jus tify blanket exclusion of gay peo ple from military). 
I have argued elsewhere th a t the decision in Romer constitutes a conscious 
signal by the Court that it will henceforth be more solicitous of the civil rights 
claims of gay litigants, a signa l t hat is deliberately evocative of the shift that the 
Court effected in its gender-d iscrimination jurisprudence in the case of R eed u. 
Reed, 404 U.S . 71 (1971 ). S ee Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Si-
lence, 106 YALE L.J. 247 (1996) . Indeed, t he insensitive treatment that the F ederal 
Courts of Appeals have afforded to the First Amendment cla ims of gay litigants 
thus far , see supra, text accompa nyi ng notes 205-208, is indicative of the kind of 
"empathy fai lure" tha t suggests that some form of heightened scrutiny for the 
disfavored group might in fact be warranted. See Yoshino, supra note 29, at 
1763-72, 1807; JOHN HAHT ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103, 160-64 (1980). 
212 Compare Professor Halley's description of an opinion by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court construing and upholding a statute that forbid s gay people to 
serve as foster parents. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (1987). In 
that case, the New Hampshire Court interprets the prohibition of the statute to 
provide an exception for people who have had same-sex sexual experiences but 
who "did not intend them in such a way as to merit the label 'homosexual.' " 
Halley, supra note 5, at 950; see In re Opinion of the Justices , 530 A.2d at 23-24. 
1997] U. S. MILITAR Y'S DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL POLICY 1211 
More even than the plain language of the statute, howev-
er, it is the stories of the gay servicemembers who have served 
and who continue to serve under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell 
policy that most clearly demonstrate what it means to live 
inside the walls of a forcibly imposed closet. Anonymous Offi-
cer Number One-a courageous and honorable woman whose 
willingness to add h er story to this Article touched the author 
very deeply-ended h er interview with the following sentiment. 
I didn' t know I wo.s gay when I joined the service. When I found out 
I was gay, I knew the service didn't a ppreciate it. I know they will 
kick me out if I don't stay quiet. But it feels rotten to h a ve to lie 
every day. After a ll , I'm gay 24 hours a day, whether or not I have 
sex. It kills me to have to lie to my close fri ends in the service about 
such a n importan t pa rt of my life . These are people who think 
they're my very best friends . They don't even know m e.213 
Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson warned us of the 
harm that could result from an attempt to compel complete 
orthodoxy in matters of opinion and identity. "Those who begin 
coercive elimination of dissent," he wrote, "soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of 
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard .... 
[T]he First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to 
avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings."2 14 The Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell policy invites gay men and lesbians to serve in 
the armed forces only at the cost of living under a constant 
compulsion to lie about who they are . It is to our great shame 
that the federal judiciary has not yet understood this fact and 
learned to employ an informed First Amendment analysis in 
describing and reviewing the policy. Let us hope that the "fixed 
star"215 of We st Virginia u. Barnette can finally begin to light 
the way. 
As H alley observes : 
[This] catego ry includes individuals whose des ires may be predominantly 
homosexual , who have acted on them, but who have determined to mask 
these facts from themse lves by embracing a purely heterosexua l subjec-
tive identity, and from others by passing as s t raight. The court's example 
forgives these lies and builds them into the scheme of state enforcement. 
Halley, supra note 5, a t 950. 
213 Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35 . 
2 14 Barnette , 319 U.S . a t 641. 
2 15 !d . a t 642. 
